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We study local loan conditions when, under external pressure, banks close branches. After 
the closure of nearby branches of their credit granting banks, firms that locally and 
hurriedly transfer to other banks receive an equivalent interest rate. However, and in stark 
contrast, where branch closures do not take place firms that purposely switch banks 
receive a 63 basis points discount. At the same time, the loan default rate for the (more 
expensive) transfer loans is on average a full percentage point lower than that for the 
(cheaper) switching loans. This suggests that firms that establish new relationships after 
their bank branch closes are “better” than regular switchers in terms of unobservable 
characteristics. Taken together, these findings provide evidence of losses for firms when 
banks close branches, even if local markets remain competitive. 
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Bank branch closures and their impact on local business are a recurring concern for policy 
makers and empirical researchers alike. Garmaise and Moskowitz (2005), for example, 
link mergers between large banks in the US to within‐county deteriorating credit 
conditions, economic development, and crime, while Nguyen (2019) finds that merger-
related branch closures cause prolonged declines in small-business lending and 
employment growth within six to eight miles of the closure. When branches close, credit 
may be rationed—for example, in so-called banking deserts (Morgan, Pinkovskiy and 
Yang (2016))—or become more expensive due to a softening in local market competition 
and/or an intensification in spatial price discrimination (Degryse and Ongena (2005)).1 
However, if the local market remains competitive and many branches of other banks 
remain located close-by, what happens to credit conditions for firms connected to the 
closing bank branch? Do firms simply “walk over to” the nearest branch of another bank, 
without facing any losses or frictions, as if to buy a standardized commodity from another 
vendor? Or is it the case that firms incur informational switching costs à la von Thadden 
(2004) or shoe leather switching costs à la Klemperer (1987) when engaging with the new 
bank?2 Put differently, is there a “stand-alone” loss for a firm when its bank branch closes? 
Is this loss observable and measurable at the individual loan level? 
To answer these questions, we study firms affected by the closure of a branch of one of 
their credit-granting banks. In particular, we study individual loan contracts the firms 
                                                 
1 Seminal work by Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), Jayaratne and Strahan (1998), and Kroszner and Strahan 
(1999) led to a very large literature investigating the impact of bank branch deregulation and resultant bank 
branch dynamics on local finance and economic growth. 
2 Event studies of the impact of bank distress and/or merger announcements on borrowing firms’ stock 
prices also contain evidence of the value of bank relationships and hence the existence of informational 
switching costs (e.g., Slovin, Sushka and Polonchek (1993), Ongena, Smith and Michalsen (2003), Karceski, 
Ongena and Smith (2005), Miyajima and Yafeh (2007)). Complementary to event studies are methods that 
investigate the long-term performance of firms whose banks are affected by distress or default (e.g., Kang 
and Stulz (2000), Gan (2007), Nakashima and Takahashi (2018); for a review, see Degryse, Kim and Ongena 
(2009)). All these studies are at the bank, not bank branch, level and none analyze the impact on loan 
conditions. 




obtain at branches of other banks (that have not lent to the firm recently), and compare 
them to the contracts of firms that stay with their banks or that switch banks in “regular 
times” (when no bank branches close). 
Portugal provides us with an almost ideal laboratory for our study. Portugal is a 
representative country with a GDP (PPP) per capita that ranks it 42nd out of 185 countries 
(International Monetary Fund, 2019 estimates). It has a well-developed financial sector 
where most firms are uniquely reliant on bank funding. Most firms are small and not 
publicly listed, which means that apart from the information shared through the 
accounting and credit registries and the information gathered through a relationship, banks 
have few other external sources of information to base their credit evaluations on. 
After 2012, hundreds of branch closures were forced upon banks in the country, but given 
the high branch density it is unlikely that local competition softened. According to the 
World Bank, in 2012 Portugal was fifth (out of 230 countries), ranked by the number of 
commercial bank branches per capita. In 2018 Portugal was fourteenth on the same list. 
Despite the large number of branch closures during this period, it remained one of the 
countries with highest branch density in the world. This allows us to focus on disruptions 
to bank–firm relationships caused by branch closures rather than by changes in local 
market competition or impaired access to financial services. 
Further, Portugal maintains and connects unique datasets that have recently been 
accessed for fundamental research purposes (e.g., Farinha and Santos (2002), Iyer et al. 
(2014), Farinha, Spaliara and Tsoukas (2019), Beck, Da-Rocha-Lopes and Silva (2020)). 
We singularly collate four unique datasets from the Banco de Portugal for the period June 
2012 to December 2015. We collect: (1) a list of all branch closures in Portugal, (2) a 
complete overview of all the corporate credit exposures of Portuguese banks, (3) the 
interest rates on all new loans, and (4) the balance sheets and income statements for all 




Portuguese firms. We arrange all information accurately together by matching on unique 
bank and firm identifiers. 
We first document that firms that were prompted (by the closure of a branch of their 
incumbent bank) to “transfer” to another bank receive an almost equal interest rate for 
their first loan from this other bank to similar (or even the same) firms contemporaneously 
receive on similar loans from similar (or even the same) banks. We establish similarity of 
banks, firms, and loans here through coarsened exact matching on various combinations 
of salient bank, firm, and/or loan characteristics. 
So at first sight, one could argue that there are no apparent losses for a firm if one (or 
more) of its bank branches closes. This argument may, however, be based on an improper 
counterfactual. Indeed, to obtain a more comprehensive picture one should also compare 
these transfer loans, originated following branch closures, to switching loans in regular 
times. Performing such an analysis, we find that when they “switch” banks firms obtain 
interest rate discounts of around 63 basis points (bps) on average.3 
Hence, strikingly, transfer loans do not carry with them any discount while switching 
loans do. In time, however, discounts reappear for subsequent switching loans or when 
firms wait more than half a year to transfer to another bank. Discounts are also present 
when firms decide to transfer to a (non-local) branch of the incumbent bank. However, 
                                                 
3 As in the transfer loan analysis this is contemporaneously compared to similar non-switchers. It is by now 
well documented that firms receive a lower interest rate when they switch from one bank to another. 
Ioannidou and Ongena (2010), for example, document an average discount of 89 bps when firms switch 
banks in Bolivia, Barone, Felici and Pagnini (2011) find an average discount of 44 bps in Italy, while Stein 
(2015) finds an average discount for main bank borrowers of 33 bps in Germany. However, this existing 
work has not yet fully settled empirically which factors cause such discounts. Other papers explore the 
impact of relationship duration on loan rates and other loan contract terms. Overall the evidence in this 
literature is rather mixed (see Kysucky and Norden (2016) for a recent meta-analysis of some of these 
findings). In contrast to this literature, we study firms and bank branches over a relevant period of time, 
identify transfers and switches, and study the loan conditions associated with transferring and switching by 
comparing the loan conditions on transfer and switching loans to the conditions on similar non-switching 
loans. 




despite receiving higher interest rates than do switching loans, loan default rates on 
transfer loans are on average one percentage point lower for these firms. This evidence 
suggests that (transferring) firms affected by branch closures are “better” than regular 
switchers in terms of unobservable characteristics. 
Importantly, the branch closures examined were forced upon the banks in a very short 
time frame, and did not reflect banks’ long-term optimal business strategies. This unique 
setting allows us to shed light on theories that explain the well-documented switching 
discounts that firms obtain when borrowing from new banks. 
Our results are entirely consistent with seminal theories of informational holdup by 
Sharpe (1990), Rajan (1992), von Thadden (2004), and Hauswald and Marquez (2006), 
among others, which we summarize in Appendix A: Informational Holdup Theory. As 
hypothesized by these models, private (repayment) information on firms collected by 
incumbent banks generates interest rate discounts for switchers. Bank branch closures 
devalue this locally stocked private information. Without such a private information 
advantage, switching discounts disappear for firms orphaned by a branch closure and 
compelled to swiftly transfer to another bank. For firms that subsequently—later in time 
or across geographical space—switch, discounts reappear. 
An alternative explanation for the existence of switching discounts is related to the 
compensation for shoe leather switching costs à la Klemperer (1987). Firms may get a 
discount from banks to pay for switching costs (e.g., filling out paperwork, providing 
detailed information about themselves, and adjusting connection software). Following 
branch closure, banks would still need to compensate firms for these costs. 
We address these potential explanations for the existence of switching costs with two 
tests. First, we adopt a strict within-firm matching strategy that allows us to compare 
transfer loans with other loans given to the same firm at the same time. Second, we run 




our specification in a subset of regions with high levels of competition. Results remain 
qualitatively the same. Shoe leather costs are unlikely to drive results because they would 
be reflected in loan rates other banks offer the firm (the loans we match transfer loans to), 
and competitive pressure would force banks to give discounts to capture customers even 
after branch closures. 
We then investigate and discard many alternative explanations for our findings. Branch 
closures may be associated with other phenomena besides the loss of private information. 
For instance, one can argue that branch closures cause selection at the firm level, given 
that branch closures are not exogenous. We tackle this question in two ways. First, we 
only look at branches that a subset of banks had to close because of restructuring 
agreements with the European Commission. To boost profitability and capital in a short 
horizon, banks were forced to close some branches even if they found them profitable. 
Results remain unchanged. Second, we predict the probability of branch closure using 
total credit amount outstanding, defaulted loans, and branch density in the region where 
the branch operates, and select only closed branches that were predicted to be the least 
likely to close. In this case too, we still obtain the same results as before. 
Even when we are convinced about the exogeneity of branch closures, particular firms 
may select themselves into transferring following branch closures, and such firms could 
have different characteristics to those of regular switchers (firm selection). To address this 
question, we match transfer loans with other loans given to the same firm. We still observe 
no discount after branch closure, but we observe discounts before closure and for 
subsequent switching loans after closure. Even with within firm matching, one may argue 
that firms that switch before closure are different from firms that switch after closure. In 
our main specification, we further restrict the sample to include only firms that switch at 




least once after branch closure. We get similar results. Therefore, our results are not likely 
to be driven by unobserved differences between endogenous closures or firms. 
Finally, selection at the bank level could also be driving results. Firms may switch to 
certain banks in normal times and to other banks following branch closures, as banks may 
specialize in different types of customers. To address this, in our main specifications we 
match transfer loans with other loans given by the outside bank—that is, the bank firms 
transfer to. The results are still valid, showing that our findings cannot be driven by bank-
specific differences with regard to how each attracts customers. 
We pursue a number of other robustness tests—namely, using alternative matching 
methods, performing sample splits, and matching according to specific characteristics 
(e.g., population density, credit worthiness). We also measure the impact of branch 
closures on other loan conditions. Qualitatively, the results do not change. 
Taken together, all our analyses provide support for the seminal theories of information 
holdup that explain the lack of discounts for transfer loans and the presence of discounts 
for switching loans. The unique setting in which branches in our study were closed allows 
for a clear understanding of the mechanisms that explain this specific finding, ruling out 
alternative explanations that have been proposed. 
In addition, our paper also contributes to the understanding of the consequences of bank 
branch closures on lending conditions. It has been documented that such closures are 
detrimental to access to loans for small businesses (Nguyen (2019), Morgan, Pinkovskiy 
and Yang (2016), Duquerroy et al. (2020)). We show that branch closures also affect loan 
pricing through the loss of information privately held by the branches that close. Further, 
we observe that firms tend to move to new banks after closure, but do not find that affected 
areas have statistically different interest rates, levels of monitoring, or loan volumes. We 




do, however, observe that banks tend to prioritize informationally transparent firms 
following branch closures. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section I describes the data. Section II presents 
variable definitions, descriptive statistics, and methodology. Section III presents our main 
findings and Section IV provides an overview of the many robustness checks. Section V 
briefly discusses the other consequences of bank branch closures. Section VI concludes. 
I. Data 
Our analysis merges records from four large and unique databases. First, we have access 
to all the data from the Portuguese public credit registry, the Central de Reponsabilidades 
de Crédito (CRC), which is managed by the Banco de Portugal (BdP). The BdP requires 
all banks to report total loan exposures of non-financial companies (henceforth “firms”). 
Accessing this unique database  one of the most comprehensive in the world (Miller 
(2003))  we have monthly corporate loans for all banks operating in Portugal between 
January 1987 and July 2015. This data allows us to retrieve loan monthly exposures for 
every firm-bank pair, including information on loan type and status (e.g., short or long 
term, in default, on or off-balance sheet exposure). 
We also employ the Portuguese database of new credit operations, the Informação 
Individual de Taxas de Juro, which is also managed by the BdP. The BdP requires 
Portuguese banks to report the interest rate of new loans given to firms. From June 2012 
to December 2014, banks with an annual volume of new loans to firms greater than €50 
million had to report the interest rates of new loans and this obligation was extended to all 




banks in January 2015.4 For each loan, there is information about the date of origination, 
interest rate, maturity, interest rate fixation period, and loan amount.5 For each borrowing 
firm, we have information about their industry, postal code, and total bank debt. 
We complement the detailed information on corporate bank loans with information on 
the balance sheet and income statements of all the firms in Portugal from the Informação 
Empresarial Simplificada (IES). This dataset is a joint project of the Ministry of Justice, 
the Ministry of Finance, Statistics Portugal, and the BdP. All Portuguese firms are required 
to file information. We use a version of this dataset managed by the BdP, in which the 
information is treated to improve its statistical quality. We also use credit scores computed 
by the BdP. 
Finally, the paper relies on the list of bank branches maintained by the BdP, i.e., the 
Registo Especial de Instituições (REI). For each branch, REI provides the opening day, 
closing day, and postal code. This database can be matched with loan data because banks 
are identified with the same codes in every dataset. We also geographically map the postal 
codes of bank branches and firms to calculate the physical distance between them. 
Because the available information for banks in the credit register is limited to the 
previous two months, information asymmetries remain.6 For example, if a firm pays back 
an overdue loan, the record resets without any trace of overdue payments on the credit 
history (Campion (2001)). 
                                                 
4 As indicated later we re-run all main specifications reported below using only the period until December 
2014 but results are virtually unaffected. 
5 Given all this information and the zero minimum loan size, the combined database is consequently even 
more comprehensive than many credit registers that have been studied and that have nonzero reporting 
thresholds, such as the registers from Bolivia (e.g., Ioannidou and Ongena (2010), Berger, Frame and 
Ioannidou (2011), or Ioannidou, Ongena and Peydró (2015)), Italy (e.g., Ippolito et al. (2016)) or Spain 
(e.g., Jiménez, Salas and Saurina (2006), Jiménez et al. (2012) or Jiménez et al. (2014)). 
6 Limiting “the amount of data made available for distribution to the financial institutions to the current 
month” is common in many countries including Portugal (see Miller (2003), Table 1A.7, Column 3). 
Administrative costs and regulatory objectives may explain the short information-sharing window. A two-
month window seems too short to achieve optimal memory loss à la Vercammen (1995). 




Apart from the information shared through the registry and the information gathered 
through a relationship, banks have few other sources of information for their credit 
evaluations in Portugal. Most firms are micro or small firms and do not have audited 
financial statements. As a result, the capital markets are accessible only for a few large 
firms and the banking sector is the principal source of capital for most firms. Since credit 
derivatives are not widely available for small and medium firms, those seeking to adjust 
interest payments have to renegotiate or switch. 
The analysis focuses on loans to private non-financial firms, in particular, on new loan 
initiations by all commercial banks between 2012:06 and 2015:05.7 We exclude overdrafts 
and current account credits to avoid distortions in the analysis of loan interest rates. 
Analyzing only new loans allows us to employ up-to-date and comparable firm and 
contract information at the precise time that firms “switch” or “transfer” to a new bank. 
The vast majority of new loans is given to firms that have more than one relationship (86 
percent). However, from all firms with some bank credit exposure in the beginning of the 
sample, only 36 percent have multiple relationships, suggesting that firms with multiple 
relationships get new loans much more often. The incidence of collateral is 38 percent, 
between the 24 percent reported by Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) and the 53 percent 
reported by Berger and Udell (1995).8 
There were 839 branch closures during the sample period. In the month preceding our 
analysis window, there were 5,971 branches in Portugal. 82 percent of all branch closures 
                                                 
7 To keep the set of financial institutions homogeneous in terms of financial structure and regulation, we 
focus on loans from commercial banks and exclude loans from other formal nonbank institutions (such as 
private financial funds, credit unions, mutual societies, etc.). Most commercial banks are privately owned. 
Banks are also prohibited from owning nonfinancial firms (Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006)). The sample 
period is characterized by an economic recession. The average growth rate of real GDP is -0.8 percent, 
somewhat lower than the average -0.03 percent growth rate of the previous five years. 
8 Hence the incidence of collateral is fairly low and even (fully) collateralized loans may still carry a positive 
loss in the event of default – a prerequisite for informational holdup models to be applicable. 




are associated with 6 banks, which had 70 percent of all firm-bank relationships (in June 
2012). In geographic terms, closures are concentrated in Lisbon and Porto. These two 
regions represent 25 and 18 percent of all bank relationships (in June 2012), and 27 and 
19 percent of all closures, respectively.9 
The significant net decrease in the number of branches occurred against a backdrop of 
pressures for cost-cutting measures. However, these pressures were not homogenously 
felt across all banks. Some of the largest banks in Portugal were recapitalized with funds 
from the bailout package agreed with the IMF, the ECB and the European Commission in 
2011. In exchange for these funds, banks had to submit restructuring plans with the aim 
of improving profitability and solvency. Given that there was a widely-shared concern 
about over-branching in Portugal, this included substantial reductions in both the number 
of branches and staff members as a prime cost-cutting measure.10 As a consequence these 
expedited branch closures were likely to be somewhat indiscriminate, i.e., not always 
based on local branch quality of firms and their profitability, providing for an 
unencumbered set of quasi-natural experiments. 
II. Definitions, Statistics and Methodology 
A. Definitions of Transfers and Switches 
We take the operational definition of switching from Ioannidou and Ongena (2010). There 
are two conditions for a new loan to be classified as a switching loan. First, this new loan 
should be obtained from a bank with which the firm did not have a relationship during the 
previous twelve months. This bank is called the outside bank. Second, the firm must have 
                                                 
9 As indicated later, removing these two regions from our sample will not affect our main findings. 
10 For further details, please see for example the Press Release on July 24, 2013, by the European 
Commission on “State aid: Commission finalizes discussions on restructuring plans for Portuguese banks 
CGD, Banco BPI, BCP.” 




had at least one relationship in the previous 12 months with at least one other bank. This 
bank is the inside bank. All new loans that do not observe these two conditions are 
nonswitching loans. In effect, we conservatively assume that key inside information can 
get stale as quickly as within one year.11 
Transfer loans are a subgroup we split off from the switching loans. In particular, we 
classify a switching loan as a transfer loan if the nearest branch of any of the inside banks 
of the firm was closed in any of the considered periods prior to the concession of the new 
loan by the outside bank (we consider 1 to 6 months after closure, 7 to 12 months after, 
and more than 12 months after as periods). Two additional conditions have to be observed 
in transfer loans. First, the physical distance between the firm and the closing branch must 
be smaller than 5 kilometers (as the crow flies). Second, after the closure the closest branch 
from this inside bank must be more than 5 kilometers away from the firm.12 These 
conditions ensure that there is a strong locational driver for the firms to approach a branch 
of another bank. Figure 1 illustrates the definitions of nonswitching, switching and transfer 
loans, while Figure 2 sketches the geographical set-up.13 
[Figures 1 and 2 around here] 
                                                 
11 As explained in Appendix A: Informational Holdup Theory, across many models in this literature inside 
banks are banks that have acquired information about the firm, while outside banks concurrently lack this 
information. 
12 As in other countries (e.g., Petersen and Rajan (2002), Degryse and Ongena (2005), Agarwal and 
Hauswald (2010)) most firms in Portugal engage banks in the vicinity. 78 percent of the firms employ at 
least one bank that has branches in the same postal zone as the firm while 63 percent firms engage only 
banks that have a branch there. The median distance between a firm and a bank is 1.9 kilometers. For radii 
of 10 kilometers estimates are qualitatively similar but based on seemingly more noisy information. 
13 Throughout our analysis we consider only single closures. If there are multiple closures affecting a firm 
at the same time, we drop them from the sample. This only affects 5 percent of our initial observations. Most 
multiple closures occur in the largest cities, where our definition of transfers rarely applies, as there are 
often other branches of the same bank nearby. 




The 12 month window was chosen to match the definition of Ioannidou and Ongena 
(2010).14 In the same manner, we assume that lending relationships comprise all sorts of 
used and unused credit, including credit contracts in which the firm shares the 
responsibility of repayment with other institutions. Our definition of switching does also 
not differentiate between those firms that “move” between banks and those firms that 
“add” a bank relationship.15 
Moreover, we do not retain firms that cease their relationship with the inside bank (i.e., 
firms that do not have any business dealings with this bank for more than 12 months), 
because this question is not relevant in the context of the informational holdup models 
that we are testing empirically. 
B. Statistics 
Table I provides descriptive statistics for transfer, nonswitching, and switching loans. 
There are 1,129 loan transfers, representing 0.08 percent of the 1,338,829 nonswitching 
loans and 5 percent of the 24,292 switching loans. The 24,292 switches in the sample 
represent 1.8 percent of all new loans in the period.16 
                                                 
14 Empirical findings suggest that a substantial portion of the bank’s inside information is collected during 
the first year (Cole (1998)). As we show later, our estimates for the switching spread are similar to theirs, 
so we consider the 12-month as appropriate. 
15 We observe that differentiating between “adders” and “movers” based on whether they have or do not 
have other outstanding loans at the time of the switch does not necessarily provide a meaningful distinction. 
Adders could be classified as movers if, at the time of the switch, their inside loans expired and were not 
renewed until after they got a loan from an outside bank. Similarly, movers could be classified as adders if 
their inside loans happened to expire a few months after the switch. It is therefore hard to develop a 
meaningful classification without relying on future (but possibly endogenous) information. That is, firms 
may decide to reverse their initial decisions, depending on future offers they receive from both the inside 
and outside banks. We also believe that investigating the conditions under which a firm obtains a loan from 
another bank (and not from an existing lender that remains operational or closes its branch) is the most 
pertinent question. It is correct that adding versus moving a relationship may be a meaningful distinction 
for de novo firms (Farinha and Santos (2002)) or for firms that switch following bank mergers (Degryse, 
Masschelein and Mitchell (2011)). As we analyze only firms that had an inside bank, de novo firms are 
unlikely to play an important role in our sample. While bank mergers do not affect results in the sample 
period, our analysis is indeed focused on differentiating between switching and transferring following local 
branch closures. 
16 From the 94,281 firms that obtained at least one new loan, 16,568 switched at least once, representing 
17.6 percent of our sample, or 5.9 percent per year. Results are similar to the previous literature about bank 




[Table I around here] 
The average interest rate for loan transfers is 5.36 percent, 219 bps less than for 
nonswitching loans and 73 bps less than for switching loans. The standard deviation is 
almost half the standard deviation of nonswitching loans and it is also smaller than the 
standard deviation of other switching loans at standard significance levels. This smaller 
standard deviation is consistent with pool-pricing. Given the variation across region and 
time in banking market conditions, and given firm characteristics that are observable to 
all banks, even pool-pricing will in practice not entail a similar loan rate for all firms. 
Other loan characteristics seem to be similar to the ones verified for switching loans, 
namely the percentage of defaulted loans, collateralization, maturity, loan amount, share 
of floating rate loans and of multiple relationships, the likelihood that the outside bank is 
the primary lender and the likelihood of multiple products in the bank relationship.  
For switching loans, loan rates are on average 146 bps lower, not accounting for 
differences in other loan and firm characteristics, than for nonswitching loans. The default 
rate on the pool of switching firms is 0.7 percent, well below the 3.4 percent verified for 
nonswitching firms. This can be explained by the fact that banks can observe in the credit 
register whether the firm has overdue loans. It might also be consistent with evergreening 
practices, empirically documented by Peek and Rosengren (2005), as inside banks are 
clearly more likely to grant a loan to a firm in distress than outside banks. 
Table II provides descriptive statistics for first and later transfers loans. In other words, 
we distinguish the first loan obtained with an outside bank after the branch of the inside 
                                                 
switching, which is summarized by Degryse, Kim and Ongena (2009). Farinha and Santos (2002) for 
example also find that 64 percent of 1,577 Portuguese de novo firms in their sample switch between 1980 
and 1996, i.e., approximately 3.7 percent of their sample switches in a year. Nevertheless, this calculation 
underestimates the annual percentage of switches in their sample because not all relationships last from 
1980 to 1996. 




bank closes from all the new loans obtained with outside banks subsequently. First and 
later transfer loans do not differ in terms of risk. In all the other dimensions analyzed, 
there are significant differences. First transfers have higher interest rates and are more 
likely to be collateralized than later transfers. At the same time, they have longer 
maturities and involve larger amounts. 
[Table II around here] 
Transfers are distributed among different industries and regions (see Internet Appendix: 
Statistics). Therefore, a straight comparison of simple averages is inadequate to draw any 
conclusions (and we will consequently rely on various matching methods to align transfer 
and switching loans with nonswitching loans to arrive at all-around comparable spreads).  
Figure 3 shows the distribution of firms that transfer or switch banks according to the 
residual maturity of their loans with the inside bank at the time of switching. When firms 
have more than one loan with the inside bank, we use as reference the shortest residual 
maturity. 
[Figure 3 around here] 
Arguably, firms should more actively consider transferring or switching to a new bank 
when they have loans to refinance. We observe that for loan transfers 67 percent of firms 
have loans with residual maturity below 90 days, while for switches only approximately 
52 percent of firms have loans with residual maturity below 90 days. In both cases, there 
is a high concentration of firms that transfer or switch from one bank to the other when 
they have loans to refinance in the short run. This concentration is significantly higher for 
firms that are confronted with a branch closure. These firms are thus under pressure to 
find a new lender to refinance their maturing loans, possibly forcing them to accept the 
pool price that firms normally contract when they get a new loan. 




C. Coarsened Exact Matching Methodology 
The ideal setting to compare transfer and switching loans (to nonswitching loans) would 
be to know the interest rate offered to the firm for a nonswitching loan. However, we do 
not have this information for many loans, so we use a matching model to derive it (we 
return to using nonswitching loans granted to the same firm in robustness).17 
We first examine whether the loan rate that the transfer or switching loan receives from 
the outside bank is lower than the rate its inside bank offered. Since the inside bank’s 
unsuccessful offer is unobservable, we approximate it using similar loans that the inside 
bank granted in the same month to other comparable firms (Figure 4). Recognizing the 
possible impact of bank characteristics on the inside and outside offers, in a similar 
matching exercise we also compare the rates on the transfer and switching loans to the 
rates of similar loans that the transferee or switcher’s outside bank granted in the same 
month to other comparable existing customers (Figure 5).18 
[Figures 4 and 5 around here] 
Table III contains the list of variables we use to establish the matching model. We 
employ coarsened exact matching, because we rely on many categorical variables. In this 
way the quality of the match is guaranteed (e.g., Stuart (2010)). For comparability 
purposes we use 30 percent intervals for the continuous variables; these intervals are set 
a priori and equally for all continuous variables (hence we do not use distributional 
information on individual variables to further optimize the quality of the match; results 
are virtually unaffected by this choice). We employ four different matching strategies and 
                                                 
17 But also in this application we can view the performed matching as “a tool for making the regression more 
effective” (Angrist and Pischke (2008)), by balancing the two groups so that we are obtaining an average 
treatment effect. 
18 While banks differ in some of their characteristics, their business model is quite homogenous. They are 
all universal banks, with a predominance of retail activities targeted at customers all over the country. 
Moreover, we are controlling for time invariant bank characteristics by matching with outside bank loans. 




revisit the choice of matching variables and matching methodology (i.e., we also employ 
a propensity score matching) in robustness. 
We match loans on the quarter they were given, on firm characteristics (credit rating,19 
region, and industry) and on loan characteristics (existence of collateral, maturity, loan 
amount, and floating loan rate). We feature the year:quarter in which the loan is granted 
to make sure loans granted under similar macro-economic conditions; credit rating, 
region, industry and legal structure make firms comparable in these vital dimensions; in 
one matching strategy firm characteristics are supplanted by firm identity; and finally, at 
the loan level collateral, maturity, amount and floating rate make loans comparable in 
their key loan terms.20 We also match either with other loans from the firm’s inside banks 
or with loans from the firm’s outside bank. For inside banks, we also match on the 
affiliation with an international banking group. 
[Table III around here] 
The impact of unobserved loan characteristics will be reflected in interest rate 
heterogeneity within the same matching group. Unobserved borrower heterogeneity 
works against finding evidence consistent with a lower interest rate granted to switchers. 
In von Thadden (2004), unobservably bad borrowers are more likely to switch.21 Hence, 
                                                 
19 The credit rating is attributed by the Banco de Portugal using an internal credit scoring model. For details 
see Antunes, Gonçalves and Prego (2016). 
20 Most studies assume that the collateral and maturity decisions are taken either independently or 
sequentially after the loan-granting decision but before the determination of the loan rate. Ignoring the joint 
character of the loan decision may bias the findings (Berger et al. (2005), Brick and Palia (2007), and Ortiz-
Molina and Penas (2008)). By matching on collateral and loan maturity, we do not need to assume anything 
about the decision process. Most studies also ignore loan fees (exceptions are Hao (2003) and Berg, 
Saunders and Steffen (2016)) and the pricing implications of cross-selling (Liberti (2004)). By matching on 
time, bank, type of loan, and loan characteristics, we control for loan fees and cross-selling (assuming banks 
at the same point in time apply the same fees and cross-selling practices to similar loans and borrowers with 
similar relationship characteristics). Matching is nonparametric and does not incorporate information from 
outside the overlap region between the treatment and control groups. At this stage it is also worth recalling 
that these matching strategies make loans similar in all these dimensions at the same time, equivalent to 
controlling with a dense set of fully “multiplicative” fixed effects (without the linear functional form 
constraint). 
21 The descriptive statistics reported in Table I show that observably bad borrowers are less likely to switch. 




if our matching variables do not adequately capture borrower quality, then bad switchers 
are more likely to be paired with good (instead of bad) nonswitchers, resulting in smaller 
estimated cuts (see simulations of the von Thadden (2004) model in Ioannidou and 
Ongena (2010)).  
We match all transfer or switching loans with nonswitching loans that have the same 
characteristics and calculate the spread between the interest rates of these loans. We 
regress the spread on a constant and weigh each observation to the inverse of the number 
of matches for each transfer or switching loan i. For instance, if transfer i has 6 matches, 
each match will have a weight of  in the regression. 
III. Main Results 
In the previous section we document that both transfers and switches occur. In this section 
we analyze interest rates for transfers and switches, and investigate whether loan rates 
after transferring and switching present distinct patterns. We also assess the differential 
quality of transfer and switching loans. In the next section, we run many robustness tests 
and compare other loans conditions, namely the rate of collateralization, maturities and 
loan amounts. 
A. Interest Rate Differential for Transfer versus Switching loans 
We now turn to our main investigation. Table IV compares the interest rate of switching 
or transfer loans with nonswitching loans before and after the closest branch of the inside 
bank that was servicing the firm was closed. Recall that all loans that borrowers receive 
after the branch is closed are classified as transfer loans. The table contains the list of 
matching variables used to compare the interest rate, the number of switching, transfer 
and nonswitching loans, the total number of observations used in each specification, and 




the average interest rate differential between switching or transfer and nonswitching loans. 
Standard errors are reported in parentheses and are clustered at firm level.22 
[Table IV around here] 
We pursue four matching strategies. In Column I, we compare the interest rate of 
switching and transfer loans with the interest rate of nonswitching loans made by firms’ 
inside banks, conditional on the specified matching variables. 
For Regression I we retain 621 switching or transfer loans, which are paired with 4,232 
nonswitching loans. The total number of matched pairs is 6,249, which means that on 
average each nonswitching loan is paired with 1.5 switching or transfer loans. Switching 
loans before branch closure have interest rates that are on average lower by 90 bps, which 
is estimated to be significant at the one percent level and most similar in magnitude to the 
ones reported in the literature.23 Transfer loans, which are the core of our analysis, do not 
receive any discount. This is the main finding in our paper, showing that new relationships 
established in the months following a branch closure do not benefit from the well-
documented switching discounts. This evidence suggests that after the branch closure the 
informational link between the inside bank and its firms is broken. As a consequence, the 
outside bank that grants the first (transfer) loan to the firm will simply pool-price and lend 
to the firm at a market interest rate reflecting pooled risks. 
One obvious concern is the heterogeneity in interest rate costs faced by banks between 
2012 and 2015. In this period financing rates varied among Portuguese banks because of 
the rising sovereign debt interest rates. Crosignani, Faria-e-Castro and Fonseca (2015) for 
example find that the lending patterns of foreign, large and small local banks were 
                                                 
22 If we also cluster at the industry-region level, the main results remain unchanged. 
23 To make our setup directly comparable to extant work, we estimate the spreads for all switching loans, 
i.e., no longer conditioning on a branch closure. We find an estimated coefficient of -122, significant at the 
1 percent level. We report this and other estimates in Table IV in Internet Appendix 0. 




heterogeneous in the period between 2005 and 2014. In Column II we therefore also match 
on the bank affiliation to an international banking group (i.e., we match local to local and 
foreign to foreign banks). Adding this matching variable does not alter the estimates.24 
In Column III, we report the interest rate differential when comparing with interest rates 
on loans granted by outside banks (recall Figure 5). Now the comparison is within the 
same bank during the same quarter. Therefore the loan rate differences between switching 
or transfer loans and nonswitching loans cannot be attributed simply to differences in the 
marginal cost of funding between inside and outside banks (or more generally to any other 
form of unobserved heterogeneity with respect to the two banks). This is an important 
advantage over the matching exercise in Column II (or any alternative exercise whereby 
even more bank characteristics are added to the set of matching variables). So for the rest 
of the paper we focus the analysis on comparing switching loan interest rates with rates 
from nonswitching loans of the outside bank to avoid the impact of heterogeneous interest 
rate policies among different types of banks. 
Column III is therefore our benchmark model (which we detail further in Table V, and 
subsequent tables). We continue to observe a switching discount (now of 63 bps). More 
importantly, our main result holds: for transfer loans in the first six months after closure 
there is again no discount. 
In Column IV we match on one extra variable, i.e., firm identity. This allows us to 
compare switching or transfer with nonswitching loans granted to the same firm in a given 
quarter. This allows us to fully control for demand at the firm level. In this case we are 
not matching a given firm with others that share the same characteristics, but we are 
                                                 
24 By using this additional matching variable, the number of observations used in the estimation decreases 
from 6,249 to 3,735. Different matching choices will condition the number of observations in each 
estimation. This is not dissimilar to the change in the number of observations underpinning identification in 
a panel setting with varying high-dimensional fixed effects. 




looking at several loans offered simultaneously to the same firm by different banks. Of 
course, this requires that we base our estimates on a much smaller sample of firms, with a 
bias towards larger firms that are more likely to obtain several loans at the same time. 
Even so, matching on firm identity does not change our main findings, i.e., the interest 
rate discount is still present and significant before closure, while one to six months after 
closure there is no discount. 
Of course, this strict matching strategy has an important trade-off in terms of the number 
of observations, as not many firms obtain several loans in the same period. Even the 
benchmark matching strategy hinges on a limited set of observations, what is necessary to 
require that the loans are truly comparable. Nevertheless, to be sure that our results are 
not biased by being too strict on the matching criteria, in Column V we report one 
additional matching exercise, now using a much looser strategy. When we match only on 
date, loan amount and loan maturity, we see that the results for loans granted by the same 
outside bank remain entirely consistent, being now based on a hundredfold larger number 
of observations. 
In Table V, we zoom in on the results obtained for transfers using the benchmark 
matching strategy (Column III from Table IV), now including a longer period after branch 
closures. Column II contains transfer loans 1 to 6 months after the closest branch of the 
inside bank is closed. As we had reported in Table IV the estimated coefficient equals 
15.62, but it is not significant at the 10 percent level. Ignoring matching would lead to a 
substantially large “hidden bias” in the estimated spreads for transfers than for switchers, 
as in this case we would find a switching discount of 181 bps after the branch closures. 
This finding suggests that borrower heterogeneity is high for transfer loans, while before 
closure outside banks attracted a more similar set of customers. 
[Table V around here] 




In the period from 7 to 12 months after the branch closure, the coefficient is negative and 
close to the initial level (-57 bps), implying that as time passes the effect of the branch 
closure disappears. From the 13th month onwards the effect of the branch closure 
disappears completely. The transfer discount is 94 bps, statistically significant at the 1 
percent level. The reason for this reappearance of the discount in later periods should be 
that firms start re-engaging banks and hence we are no longer dealing with first transfer 
loans. These later transfers thus resemble regular switches. 
The pattern is similar for the other matching strategies. Even when we use the tighter 
matching strategies comparing loans granted to the same firm by outside and inside banks 
after a branch closure (Column IV in Table IV) we obtain consistent results. There are no 
switching discounts immediately after branch closure. One year afterwards, this effect has 
vanished. 
In the first column of Table V we include all switching loans by firms that switch in areas 
affected by branch closures. One could argue that firms that switch after closure are 
different from firms that switch before closure. As robustness, we use only firms that 
switch at least once in the period after closure. We do not report these results separately 
because they are the same as in Table V except for the period before closure. Before 
closure, we obtain 37 observations and an average interest rate difference with matching 
of -228.62 bps. The coefficient is statistically significant at the 10% level. Hence, results 
do not seem to be driven by different firms switching after closure. 
B. First versus Later Transfers 
According to the informational holdup theory, only the first transfer loan after branch 
closure should not have the interest rate discount observed in switching loans. After the 
first transfer loan, the firm establishes a relationship with a new bank. As a consequence, 
in future transfer loans the outside bank of the first transfer in effect becomes a new inside 




bank, therefore able to hold up the firm. Hence, the outside bank in subsequent transfer 
loans has to offer the switching rate that we observed before, otherwise the firm will 
continue to borrow from the inside bank. 
To test this conjecture, we separate first transfers from later transfers. Transfers are 
classified as “first transfers” if the firm is switching for the first time after the branch of 
its inside bank has closed and as “later transfers” otherwise. Table VI Panel A shows 
interest rate differentials for first transfer loans only. The structure is similar to the one 
used in Table V. Switching loans are matched with nonswitching loans from the outside 
bank. Matching variables are the ones used in Column III of Table IV. Before the branch 
closure, we use the same switching loans of Table V for easy reference, yielding the same 
switching discount of 63 bps. 
When we only keep first transfers that occur 1 to 6 months after the closure, the 
coefficient is positive and results are not significant at the 10 percent significance level, 
meaning that there is no evidence of a switching discount up to 6 months after the closure 
of the branch. 
[Table VI around here] 
Considering only first transfers 7 to 12 months after the closure, the coefficient is now 
positive, very close to 0, and still non-significant at the 10 percent significance level. In 
Table V the coefficient was negative and significant, which implies that later transfers 
were driving this result. As a consequence, the evidence is consistent with the fact that the 
effect of the branch closure goes beyond 6 months. 
More than 12 months after the closure, the coefficient is -97 bps, close to the -94 bps 
reported in Table V. Results are now significant at the 1 percent level. These results imply 
that in the long-term the effect of the branch closure fades even for first transfer loans. 
The evidence is consistent with the gradual fading of pool-pricing of the group of firms 




transferring in immediate need of financing, to a reestablishment of a discount granted to 
individual “switching” firms to be recovered later through informational holdup. 
Table VI Panel B contains interest rate differentials for later loan transfers. This table 
again follows the same structure as in Table V. In the 1 to 6 months after the branch 
closure, the interest differential is -82 bps, but not statistically significant, suggesting that 
these loans may not enjoy any switching discount. 
In the 7 and 12 months after the branch closure, the interest rate differential for these 
later transfers is -115 bps and is significant at the 5 percent level. Beyond 12 months after 
the branch closure, the switching discount is 89 bps, significant at the 1 percent level.  
These results contrast with the findings from Table VI Panel A. While for first transfers 
there is no switching discount in the first year after branch closure, for later transfers we 
observe a sizeable discount. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that the outside 
bank receiving the transferring firm informationally captures it such that later transfers 
involving new outside banks will again result in the switching discount we have seen so 
far. 
C. Transferring Within the Inside Bank 
In Table VII we investigate (regular) switching versus transferring within the inside 
bank, which is the bank that closes the branch. Hence we assess the spread between the 
interest rate on switching or first transfer loans now granted by other branches from the 
same inside bank that closes a branch and the interest rate on new nonswitching loans 
obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms), all of this before and after the 
closest branch of the inside bank closes.25 
                                                 
25 In this estimation, we also match on the length of relationship. This might be important if we consider 
that a long lasting bank-firm relationship allows the inside bank to collect more private information on the 
firm. Nevertheless, the results are not sensitive to this choice. 




[Table VII around here] 
If other branches of the inside bank are inconveniently located in other areas (which is 
often the case) and if geographical distance dilutes the quality of the information signal 
these branches are able to obtain (as in Hauswald and Marquez (2006), Agarwal and 
Hauswald (2010)), then we would expect the pricing of these within-inside bank transfers 
to be priced more like later transfer (or switching) loans whereby firms once more receive 
the discount. That is exactly what we find.26 
D. Default after Transferring 
In Table VIII we distinguish between switching and transfer loans one or two years after 
switching or transferring with respect to their default probability and the loan loss rate 
given default. In Panel A of the table, the dependent variable equals one if the firm defaults 
at the firm-bank level. In Panel B the dependent variable equals the share of the 
outstanding amount in default for all firm-bank pairs. We include more control variables 
as we move from Columns I to III (that study a one-year horizon), and similarly from 
Columns IV to VI (for a two year horizon). 
[Table VIII around here] 
We find that in all instances, but in particular for a two year horizon, the estimated 
coefficient on transfer loans is negative suggesting that transfer borrowers are less likely 
to default than switchers. These results are consistent with informational holdup theory, 
which predicts that switchers are on average worse than nonswitchers, but also that both 
good and bad firms switch. 
                                                 
26 We cannot find evidence that there are significant differences in pricing behavior towards good and bad 
quality firms, which could suggest that distance does not deteriorate the informational signal. 





A. Local Banking Sector Competition and Unexpected Branch Closures 
We note that Portugal is one of the EU countries with the highest bank branch density.27 
The closure of a few branches is unlikely to affect local bank competition and thus our 
results should be driven by asymmetric information rather than by changes in 
competition.28 To exclude the latter possibility entirely, in an Appendix B: Robustness of 
Empirical Findings we discuss an extensive array of analyses of areas where given the 
many branches present the hypothetical closure of a branch should have an even more 
negligible impact on competition. Our findings are unaffected by focusing on such areas. 
To be sure that the absence of discounts after loan transfers is not due to the fact that 
branch closures could have been anticipated, we run our estimates for a subsample of 
branches that were more unlikely to close. To do that, we first estimate a simple model to 
compute the likelihood of individual branch closure (as in Morales Acevedo and Ongena 
(2020)). 
In Table IX we report the results of a regression model that estimates the probability of 
individual branch closures. We run both linear probability model (LPM) and probit 
specifications.29 In Figure 6 we show the predictive quality of the model using a ROC 
curve. When controlling for county, bank and time fixed effects, we find that smaller 
branches are more likely to close. Further, a higher local branch density is also associated 
with a higher probability of branch closure. 
                                                 
27 According to the International Monetary Fund Financial Access Survey Portugal had 54 commercial bank 
branches per 100,000 adults in 2014, while France, Germany and Italy had 38, 15, and 60, respectively. 
28 In the Internet Appendix: Data we provide summary statistics on banks and branches at the municipality 
level. 
29 One may be concerned about the incidental parameters problem in the probit specification. Note however 
that the number of months covered in the sample is relatively high (43) and that we do not include firm 
fixed-effects. The dummies we include in the model (e.g., bank dummies) are equal to one for many 
observations. 




[Table IX and Table X and Figure 6 around here] 
Our next step is to estimate our main empirical specification on transfers for a subsample 
of branches that were unlikely to close (Table X). To do that, we use the estimated 
likelihood of individual branch closure using a probit model. If we split the sample in 
three quantiles according to this likelihood and use only the group of branches that were 
least likely to close, we confirm that our results remain unchanged. 
B. Comparison and Matching Methodology 
So far comparisons between transfer and switching loans are based on singular estimates 
for each group. In Table XI, we now directly compare the difference between interest rate 
discounts of transfer and switching loans. We match switching loans with nonswitching 
loans that share the characteristics of Column III of Table IV and calculate the interest 
rate difference between each switching loan and their matching nonswitching loans. We 
regress interest rate differentials on a constant and on a categorical variable that classifies 
loan transfers according to the number of months since the closure of the branch of the 
inside bank. 
Switching loans that are not loan transfers have an average discount of 63 bps, 
significantly different from 0 at the most common significance levels. In comparison to 
other switching loans, loan transfers up to 6 months after the branch closure have average 
interest rates greater than the switching interest rate by 78 bps. This result is statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level, which confirms that loan transfers immediately after 
branch closures have interest rates that are significantly higher than the rates of normal 
switching loans. For later transfers, we do not observe this effect, as coefficients are not 
significant at the 10 percent significance level. 
[Table XI around here] 




To ensure that our results are further robust to different matching strategies, we 
extensively revisit our matching methodology choices in the Appendix B: Robustness of 
Empirical Findings. We further investigate and discuss various other sample composition 
and issues with variable definitions in this Appendix. At this stage we also note that our 
main results hinge on ensuring that firms matched in treatment and control groups are as 
similar as possible. This of course depends on the choice of matching variables. 
 
C. Matching and Differentiating Variables 
C.1. Within-Firm and Firm Credit Rating 
In Tables XII and XIII we return to the limited set of first and later transfer loans for which 
we also observe concurrent nonswitching loans being granted to the same firm, i.e., the 
matching scheme in Column IV in Table IV. Matching at the firm-level addresses two 
concerns. First, we verify if results are not driven by unobserved characteristics of firms 
that switch after branch closure. Second, we verify if results are driven by shoe-leather 
costs à la Klemperer (1987). If this is the case, we should see discounts after branch 
closure, since entrants would still have to compete with other incumbent banks, who 
provide the loans we are matching with. 
[Tables XII and XIII around here] 
While also matching on firm identity provides a high degree of confidence in having 
controlled for all relevant heterogeneity, fewer observations remain. For example we 
observe only 14 first transfer loans in the period 1 to 6 months after the branch closure 
that can be matched with 28 nonswitching loans. But despite this substantial drop in the 
number of observations results remain qualitatively most similar. 




Recall that in our baseline results, one of the matching variables used is firms’ credit 
rating. This allows us to be sure that potential pricing differences are not attributable to 
differences in perceived risk. Nevertheless, it is interesting to dig deeper into this issue 
and examine if transfer and switching outcomes are similar for good and bad quality firms. 
Appendix B: Robustness of Empirical Findings discusses a set of exercises showing that 
the main results are not driven by differences in credit ratings. 
C.2. Bank-Firm Relationship Characteristics 
Another dimension on which it might be important to further extend our analysis is to 
consider issues on the relationship between borrowers and lenders. The number, 
uniqueness and length of the relationships between borrowers and lenders influence the 
way interest rates are set (e.g., Petersen and Rajan (1994) and Berger and Udell (1995)).30 
For instance, firms with a single bank relationship may face more difficulties in finding a 
new bank and may therefore face different pricing conditions. 
To address this concern, in Table XIV Panel A we use a dummy that tags firms with 
multiple bank relationships in the month before the new loan as an extra matching 
variable. We once more observe similar results. Hence, interest rate discounts for switches 
and the impact of branch closures on switching discounts seems not to be driven by 
matching single relationship and multiple relationship loans. 
In Panel B we only consider transfers if they are caused by closure of the branch of the 
firm’s main lender. It is possible that the impact of branch closure is larger when this is 
the main bank of the firm. Still, the results are similar to the ones obtained in Table IV. 
The interest rate spread between the switching loan and similar loans is close to 0 and not 
                                                 
30 Various dimensions of bank-firm relationships are found to be associated with salient features of firm 
financing and performance (e.g., Brunner and Krahnen (2008), Degryse, Kim and Ongena (2009)). 




statistically significant for transfers 1 to 6 months after the branch closure. There are no 
interest rate discounts when the main lender closes its branch. It remains statistically not 
different from zero even in the window that goes beyond 12 months. Assuming that the 
main lender is the most important one for the firm, these results corroborate the conclusion 
that the change in soft information explains the existence of interest rate discounts for 
switching firms. 
In Panel C we further explore the dynamics of the lock-in effects. We examine the 
(additional) switching and transfer discounts for firms that have long relationships. We 
find that the switching discounts are more significant for firms with longer relationships 
(more than 3 years), thus supporting the existence of lock-in effects. However, in the year 
after branch closure, the discount vanishes both for shorter and longer relationships, giving 
further support to the hypothesis that switching discounts are indeed driven by asymmetric 
information issues. 
Finally, we consider a subset of firms that transfer to a bank with whom they never had 
any previous relationship (Panel D). In our baseline specification, we consider that there 
is a transfer (or a switch) when a new relationship is established with a bank that did not 
lend to that firm in the previous 12 months. This implies that we consider that private 
information about the firm might get stale after 1 year. To be more stringent, we consider 
only truly new relationships. Once more, the main results are unchanged. 
D. Other Loan Conditions 
Table XV compares loan conditions of transfer or switching loans with loan conditions of 
comparable nonswitching loans using the same matching technology as in Column III 
Table IV. Recall that with this matching exercise, we aim to simulate the offered loan 
conditions as if the firm had not switched to any new outside bank and compare them with 
the transfer or switching conditions offered by this bank. 




[Table XV around here] 
Panel A contains all transfer loans, while Panel B contains first transfers, and Panel C 
later transfers. Column I reports the results for interest rates, column II for the existence 
of collateral attached to a loan, column III for loan maturity and column IV for loan 
amount. 
In Panel A none of the loan conditions are statistically different at the 5 percent level. 
Transfers are less likely to be collateralized by 8 percentage points, but this result is only 
statistically significant at the 10 percent level. 
Results are more evident at Panel B because we are only including first transfers. None 
of the loan conditions are statistically different at the 10 percent level, indicating that loan 
transfers and nonswitching loans share on average the same loan conditions.  
In Panel C, the interest rate of later transfers is lower on average by 111 bps in 
comparison with nonswitching loans. Loan amounts of later loan transfers are on average 
lower by €22,945. According to Degryse, Kim and Ongena (2009), relationship borrowers 
tend to have better access to finance and therefore obtain larger loans than other borrowers 
that are initiating their relationship with another bank.31 However, we only find this effect 
for later transfers.  
There are not statistically significant differences on loan maturity for transfer loans, even 
though we find that switching loans have a longer maturity on average (0.63 months). 
These results are consistent with hold up theories, showing that firms that establish new 
relationships after a branch closure are not able to reap the benefits usually obtained when 
switching. 
                                                 
31 In most informational holdup models (and to facilitate theoretical interpretation) all granted loans are of 
unit size, making these findings that are indeed seemingly inconsistent with such models not entirely 
straightforward to interpret. 




V. The Effects of Branch Closures 
We have shown that firms obtain higher interest rates if they establish a new relationship 
with a bank after a branch of their inside bank closes than they would if this relationship 
was established in normal conditions. This result allows us to identify the mechanism 
underlying the well-documented switching discounts in banking, showing that they are 
anchored to information asymmetries leading to a holdup problem. 
The richness of our data and the widespread presence of branch closures allow us to 
analyze what happens after branches close along several other dimensions that go beyond 
loan pricing, thus complementing results obtained by De Juan (2003), Cerutti, 
Dell’Ariccia and Martínez Pería (2007), Coccorese (2012), and recently Allen, Damar and 
Martinez-Miera (2016), Brown, Guin and Kirschenmann (2016), Martin-Oliver (2016), 
Xu et al. (2018), and Qi et al. (2020). 
In Table XVI we show what happens to firms affected by branch closures in the 12 
months after the event occurred. After one year, 17 percent of these firms had obtained 
loans from a new bank. In the first month after closure, 8 percent of affected firms 
established relationships with new banks, compared with 3 percent for the whole financial 
system. Some firms continue to borrow from the same bank, despite the closure (7 
percent). However, the vast majority (70 percent) do not obtain any new bank loan in the 
12 months after branch closure. One month after closure, 4 percent of all affected firms 
get loans from their incumbent bank, compared with 6 percent for the whole financial 
system. 
[Table XVI around here] 
In Table XVII we look into another dimension of loan pricing. We compare the interest 
rate of new loans given by inside banks in areas where they close branches against similar 




loans they give in other areas. Matched loans do not have significantly different interest 
rates, which goes against the idea that inside banks abandon areas where they close 
branches. However, when we do not match interest rates go down considerably one year 
after the branch closure. These results are consistent with banks` lending to less opaque 
customers after branch closures. 
[Table XVII around here] 
To further explore what happens to firms in terms of access to credit in the aftermath of 
a branch closure, we also look into credit profile consultations in the Credit Register. 
When a bank is approached by a new potential customer, the bank can, with the customer’s 
consent, consult his situation in the Credit Register. In Column I of Table XVIII we 
measure the probability that bank i downloads at least one credit profile of firms located 
in zip code j. The download probability decreases by 1.84 percentage points for banks that 
close branches, one to six months after branch closure. There is no significant change in 
the probability of credit profile downloads for other banks. 
[Table XVIII around here] 
In Column II of Table XVIII we look at new loan volume given by bank i in zip code j. 
There is no significant change in loan volume either for banks that close branches or for 
other banks, thus suggesting that there are no major additional contractions in credit 
supply coming from the banks that are closing down branches. 
In Table XIX, Column I shows the evolution of the number of firms with credit profile 
downloads and Column II the change in the volume of new loans. Here we aggregate 
credit profile downloads and new loans at the zip code level, and not at the zip code-bank 
level, in order to understand what happens locally. These two variables do not seem to 
change much after branch closures. In Table XX we report the probability that firms 
affected by a branch closure to get a new loan after that event, compared to the probability 




they recorded before closure. The results confirm that nothing changed in a significant 
way. 
[Tables XIX and XX around here] 
Taken together, these results suggest that branch closures in Portugal in the analyzed 
period did not lead to local credit crunches. Our main results also show that these firms 
borrow from inside banks at rates that are not statistically different from the average 
interest rate granted by those banks. These outcomes possibly reflect the fact that despite 
the large number of closures, branch density in Portugal continues to rank among the 
highest in the world. This makes us even more confident that the results on loan pricing 
are driven by asymmetric information issues rather than by changes in local competition. 
VI. Conclusion 
Using comprehensive data from Portuguese bank branch closures and new loans granted 
between 2012 and 2015, we study how inside information affects loan conditions. The 
interest rate on loans that firms obtain following the closure of the branch of their “inside” 
bank—so, when transferring to a branch of another bank in the same vicinity—is not 
different from the interest rate on non-switching loans. At the same time, and consistent 
with previous findings in the literature, we find that switching loans carry interest rates 
that are on average 63 bps lower than those of non-switching loans. These findings suggest 
that firms incur a loss by foregoing a discount when their bank branch closes. 
Later transfers (so, not the first following the branch closure) again enjoy statistically 
significant interest rate discounts, as do within-bank transfers to other (potentially far-
flung) branches. We also observe that transfers are associated with lower loan defaults if 
we compare them with regular switches. 




The main contribution of our paper is to show that the interest rate discounts that a firm 
typically obtains when establishing a relationship with a new bank vanish if these new 
matches are forged in the aftermath of the closure of a branch that was providing the firm’s 
financing. This is consistent with theories of holdup in banking, suggesting that branch 
closure (at least partially) destroys the information captured by the inside banks. These 
results still hold even when considering a large variety of factors that may cause such 
behavior. 
We also analyze the local impact of branch closures. Firms borrow more from other 
banks following a closure, and banks that close branches tend to lend to more 
informationally transparent firms. However, on aggregate there are no significant 
differences in terms of interest rates, levels of monitoring, or loan volumes. Despite the 
large number of branch closures and the immediate consequences for loan pricing for 
firms that establish new relationships, there are no scarring effects in terms of access to 
credit. That said, the branch closures in question did not significantly change the local 
banking landscape, as the figure for branches per capita remained among the highest in 
the world. This implies that over-branching can be successfully dealt with without 
compromising small businesses’ access to credit. 
  




Appendix A: Informational Holdup Theory 
What happens when firms have to change banks and establish new relationships? We start from a 
literature in which it is conjectured that a bank’s ability to privately and recurrently observe 
proprietary information about its customer during a relationship can be beneficial to the customer, 
but it can also impose certain costs.32 A credit relationship can foster flexibility in writing loan 
contracts (Boot and Thakor (1994) and von Thadden (1995)) and can increase access to capital at 
a lower cost and/or with less collateral. In addition, banks may smooth interest rates and reschedule 
capital payments to help their customers overcome financial difficulties (Chemmanur and 
Fulghieri (1994)). A relationship with a reputable institution may also facilitate current and future 
funding from both shareholders and alternative outside sources (Diamond (1991)). Finally, the 
confidentiality of a relationship may facilitate screening and monitoring (Campbell (1979)) and 
prevent the leakage of proprietary information to product market competitors (Bhattacharya and 
Chiesa (1995) and Yosha (1995)). 
Access to private information about a borrower could also lead to holdup problems, however, 
and to the extraction of informational rents. In Sharpe (1990), the incumbent bank has the ability 
to extract rents from its best customers by “holding up” customers from receiving competitive 
financing elsewhere.33 The incumbent “inside” bank gains this monopoly power through its 
informational advantage over the other “outside” banks. If a high quality or “good” borrower tries 
to switch to a new, uninformed bank, it gets pooled with low quality or “bad” firms and is offered 
a higher loan rate. And, in the model proposed by von Thadden (2004) following Sharpe (1990) 
and Rajan (1992), outside banks will optimally randomize loan rates to attract firms that have the 
same observed characteristics but in the end at best break even in terms of profits. From his model, 
three hypotheses are empirically verifiable: 
 
(H1) Firms will switch banks, from one period to the next. 
 
                                                 
32 Our discussion adjusts Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) to our setting. Boot (2000), Ongena and Smith 
(2000), Berger and Udell (2002), Elyasiani and Goldberg (2004), Degryse and Ongena (2008), Degryse, 
Kim and Ongena (2009), Degryse, Ioannidou and Ongena (2015), Duqi, Tomaselli and Torluccio (2018), 
and Degryse, Morales-Acevedo and Ongena (2019), among others, review this literature. 
33 Holdup costs are also present in Rajan (1992), since in his model the bank has the power to withdraw 
financing when it perceives the firm to be inadequately managed. This degree of control can be costly 
because it reduces the incentives of the firm manager to exert effort. In Hauswald and Marquez (2003), the 
informational advantage is differentiated across banks. See also Egli, Ongena and Smith (2006), Black 
(2011) and Karapetyan and Stacescu (2014). 




(H2) Loans to new applicants will obtain similar interest rates compared to nonswitching loans if 
the inside bank (or any other bank) is known not to have private information about the specific 
firm, which is the case with “pooling” in the first period of the model. 
 
(H3) Switching loans have lower interest rates than nonswitching loans if the inside bank is known 
to have collected private information about the firm, which is the case with “poaching” in the 
second period of the model. 
 
The second hypothesis describes the pricing that occurs in its first period of the model and this 
scenario may arise if a branch of the inside bank closes and all its firms have to transfer; outside 
banks will then pool-price the arriving firms. In essence, the third hypothesis summarizes the 
differential pricing of switchers and nonswitchers in the second period in von Thadden (2004).34 
It is in the careful comparison of the differential pricing in these two situations that resides the 
contribution of our paper. 
von Thadden (2004) also contains predictions with respect to the quality of switchers. Higher 
quality firms are less likely to switch because incumbent banks seek to retain them; still von 
Thadden (2004) expects that a mixture of good and bad firms will switch. The fourth testable 
hypothesis is therefore: 
 
(H4) Both low- and high-quality firms switch banks, but low quality firms switch more 
proportionally than high quality firms. 
 
In sum, inside banks charge good borrowers loan rates that are higher than warranted by their true 
quality (were it publicly known). The more severe the informational asymmetries (e.g., the 
stronger the bank-firm relationship), the higher the informational rents. Banking models that 
incorporate holdup are founded on two key assumptions: 
 
(A1) Relationships mitigate informational asymmetries between firms and banks. 
                                                 
34 Recall that the pooling rate in the first period is lower than the fair rate if competing banks expect to 
extract informational rents in the second period. Simulations of von Thadden (2004) in Ioannidou and 
Ongena (2010), Internet Appendix II, show that the difference between the average loan rate on all loans 
granted (in the second period) and the average pooling rate (in the first period) will be one quarter of the 
difference between accepted and offered loan rates for switchers and one third of the difference between 
switchers and stayers when matching on firm quality. Put differently, in von Thadden (2004) the discount 
on transfer loans (in the first period) will be less than one third of the size of the discount on switching loans 
(in the second period). We confirm and robustify these findings with further simulations for this paper. 




(A2) Relationships create informational asymmetries between inside and outside banks that are 
alleviated by observable firm information. 
 
Information asymmetry is not a necessary condition for switching discounts. Klemperer (1987) 
discusses that in oligopolistic markets with switching costs banks have incentives to provide 
introductory offers to capture rents when there are repeated interactions with firms, even when 
both incumbent and entrant banks have the same information about the firm. 
The suboptimal closure of bank branches within a short time frame provides the quasi-ideal 
setting to understand how these theories and hypotheses shape the commonly observed switching 
discounts. 
  





Appendix B: Robustness of Empirical Findings 
In this Appendix we report on many alterations of the exercises presented in the paper. We report 
the estimates in an Internet Appendix that comes with a Table of Contents that indicates the 
Internet Appendix Number, the issue addressed, the analysis done and its operationalization. 
Overall, the many estimates show robustness and consistency of interpretation in the paper.  
A. Changes in Local Competition 
To ensure that our estimates are not driven by changes in competition we analyze areas where the 
hypothetical closure of a branch should have a negligible impact on competition.35 For that 
purpose, we calculate the impact of each branch closure in our data set on the local HHI (for a 
radius of 5 km around the closure and an HHI calculated based on branch presence). In Internet 
Appendix 1 we re-do Tables V to VII for firms served by branches that witness a minor change in 
HHI which is below 25 (which is a few points below the median change on a scale of 0 to 10,000; 
see Internet Appendix 1 Figure 1).36 These are the areas in which closing a branch should have the 
smallest impact on competition. Internet Appendix 1 Figure 2 shows the variation in branch 
density per municipality. 
We obtain the same conclusions as before. There is an interest rate discount for loan switches, 
which varies between 59 and 122 bps, and this discount does not exist for transfers and first 
transfers 1 to 6 months after the branch closure. These estimates imply that our findings so far are 
robust across different levels in the intensity of competition.37 
In the Internet Appendix 2 we use only small banks within highly competitive areas. If discounts 
still exist in high competition areas for small banks that have arguably no market power, then it is 
unlikely that discounts are being generated by an increase in competition after branch closure. Our 
                                                 
35 While the pool-pricing of transfer loans should in principle be unaffected by the organizational 
characteristics of the closing branch, the pricing of switching loans can be affected by the organization of 
the inside bank. Loan officers at decentralized banks for example may be more incentivized to collect and 
use soft information (Stein (2002)) that may be more private in nature than the hard information employed 
to price loans in centralized banks. The discount received when switching from a decentralized bank will 
then be steeper. See also Degryse, Laeven and Ongena (2009). For this and other Internet Appendices we 
also re-calculate all estimates for switching loans unconditional on branch closure, i.e., the equivalent of 
Internet Appendix 0 Table IV. Findings are consistent and available upon request (or can be found in earlier 
versions of the paper on the internet). 
36 The mean HHI is 1,423 and the median is 1,250. According to the guidelines of the U.S. Department of 
Justice, a market in which the HHI is between 1,500 and 2,500 is considered to be moderately concentrated, 
and markets in which the HHI is in excess of 2,500 points are considered highly concentrated. 
37 In a further robustness exercise, we consider only transfers in which the HHI of the inside bank does not 
decrease by more than 25 points. The results remain valid. 




results are broadly consistent with what we had before, thus providing further evidence that 
changes in competition do not play a role in our story. 
To be sure that the effect on interest rates is not being driven by changes in local competition, 
we explicitly control for changes in the HHI (Internet Appendix 3). We compute the change in 
HHI between month t-1 and t using the number of branches within a 5 km radius. We include a 
quadratic effect as well, to consider potential non-linearities. The change in HHI has a positive 
concave effect on the spread between transfer and switching loans only in the 7-12 months 
window. A decrease in competition increases loan interest rates 7-12 months after the branch 
closure. However, our main results for transfer firms remain unchanged. 
B. Firm Quality 
In our baseline results, one of the matching variables used is firms’ credit rating. As indicated 
before this allows us to be sure that potential pricing differences are not attributable to differences 
in perceived risk. Nevertheless, it is interesting to dig deeper into this issue and examine if 
switching and transfer outcomes are similar for good and bad quality firms. This is even more 
relevant if we recall that one of our aims is to test the informational holdup models, which predict 
that because of adverse selection, a higher proportion of switching firms is worse-off in terms of 
unobservable risk characteristics than if the firms had been randomly drawn from the population 
(which resembles more the branch closure situation that generated the transfer loans). 
In Internet Appendices 4 and 5 we do a sample split of firms according to their credit rating. In 
Appendix 4 we use firms that have a probability of default below the median and in Appendix 5 
we use firms with a probability of default above the median. We replicate Table V in both 
appendices and find the same results for the two groups. Apparently it is not the differences in 
credit ratings that drive our main results. Interestingly, we observe that better quality firms have 
larger switching discounts. 
C. Matching Strategies 
To be sure that our results are as robust as possible to different matching strategies, in Internet 
Appendices 6 to 12 we re-run Table V with different matching variables. 
In Appendix 6 we match switching loans on county instead of province and obtain similar interest 
rate discounts for switching loans. We also do not find statistically significant interest rate 
discounts for loan transfers 1 to 6 months after the branch closure. 
In Appendix 7 we match on branch density (number of branches in the county per 1,000 adults) 
and find similar results for switching discounts and loan transfer discounts 1 to 6 months after the 
branch closure. Results from Appendices 6 and 7 address remaining concerns that our baseline 
results are driven by differences between the regions of the switching loans and the regions of the 
matching loans. 




In Appendix 8 we create a categorical variable that classifies firms as being micro-sized, small, 
medium-sized or large. We create this classification using the guidelines defined in the EU 
recommendation 2003/361. We use this variable as an additional matching variable, replicate 
Table V, and arrive at qualitatively similar conclusions. 
To further push our matching strategy in Appendix 9 we report the results of a much stricter 
approach. Instead of matching transfer firms with nonswitching loans, we match transfer firms 
with switching firms arriving at the same bank. This means that we are comparing two firms that 
establish a new relationship with the same bank at the same time, sharing a number of similar 
characteristics. The only observable difference is that one firm is switching likely because the 
closest branch of its former bank closed, while the other is switching due to an endogenous choice. 
The results suggest that there are no discernable differences in the interest rates offered by a bank 
to these two types of firms, which are switching for different reasons, neither before nor 
immediately after the branch closure. Transfer loans are indeed somewhat more expensive, as we 
would expect, 7 to 12 months after the branch closure. However, we should emphasize that these 
results are based on a very small number of observations (12 matched pairs in the 6 months after 
closure and 9 matched pairs between 7 and 12 months). 
In order to increase the number of observations, we loosen the matching strategy along a few 
dimensions, namely collateral, legal structure of the firms and fixed vs floating interest rates 
(Appendix 10). We still have a very reduced number of observations (19 pairs in the 6 months 
after closure). The results are slightly stronger than in Appendix 9, but they are overall similar. 
To be fully transparent on the impacts of our matching strategy, in Appendix 11 we show our 
results for transfer loans when we exclude one matching variable at a time. The results are 
remarkably consistent, with only two exceptions: when we do not match by province or by loan 
amount, we observe also statistically significant discounts on transfer loans in the 6 months 
following a branch closure. However, there may exist important differences between provinces or 
firms asking for significantly different loan amounts that make these controls especially relevant. 
One final test on the matching strategy is to use a propensity score matching algorithm instead 
of the coarsened exact matching strategy (Appendix 12). The propensity score matching is a 
different matching strategy (e.g., Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983)) because it relies on matching 
similar firms instead of firms that share exactly the same characteristics. The trade-off is that we 
are able to increase the number of matches (e.g., Stuart (2010)). Despite the methodological and 
sample differences, the results on transfer loans are entirely consistent. 




D. Other Robustness 
In Internet Appendices 13 to 22 we go on to further test the robustness of our findings for other 
dimensions. First, we analyze sub-samples of our dataset and revisit two earlier mentioned issues, 
pertaining to the sample period and geographical area covered by our study. 
In Appendix 13 we replicate Tables IV and V excluding the period starting in December 2014 
after which all banks had to report loan rates. 
In Appendix 14 we exclude Lisbon and Porto, large cities where many closures occurred yet 
distances may play a different role than elsewhere due to branch density. In both cases our findings 
are most similar. 
In Appendix 15 we include the month of the branch closure and the month before the branch 
closure in the post-transfer period, i.e., we assume that in the month before the branch closure 
firms already act as if the branch of the incumbent bank has been closed. With this assumption, 
we obtain similar results for transfers. 
To be sure that the results are not driven by a few special loans, we consider a subsample where 
we take only branch closures that lead to more than 10 transfers (Appendix 16). We still obtain an 
average positive but non-significant interest rate differential 1 to 6 months after closure. 
Another potentially relevant issue is that firms are not forced to search for a new relationship 
immediately after their branch closes. Even though that will likely be the case in most situations, 
as firms often interact with banks to have access to a variety of services that go beyond bank loans, 
in some cases a firm may wait until its loan expires before searching for a new bank. This is 
actually what might explain why switching discounts re-emerge after the branch closure, as these 
are firms that could afford more time to look for a better deal (and the bank has time to make a 
more solid assessment). To exclude these situations, in Appendix 17 we show the results for the 
subset of firms that had to refinance a loan within 90 days after branch closure. Our results still 
hold. 
One of the reasons why the pool-pricing argument is relevant comes from the fact that, as 
mentioned above, banks might have trouble in processing information on a pool of new borrowers 
that suddenly arrive at the bank. To check whether the degree of information asymmetry between 
borrowers and lenders truly matters in this setting, in Appendix 18 we run our estimates only for 
the most opaque firms (defined as those with fewer than 10 employees, and turnover or assets 
below €2 million, located in areas with branch density below the median). In this case, the results 
are quite stronger. These firms never get a discount when they switch, regardless of the time 
horizon. Banks seem to always pool price loans on firms on which they might have more 
difficulties in assessing their true quality. 
In Appendices 19 and 20 we look at what happens to switchers and transferers over time. 
Ioannidou and Ongena (2010) show that switching discounts tend to vanish over time, as the firm 




gets locked-in the new relationship. That is consistent with the results we obtain in Appendix 19. 
For transfer loans, in Appendix 20, which start without a discount, the interest rates are never 
statistically different from those of the control group. 
In Appendix 21 we show the results of what we can call a placebo test. We still compare interest 
rates on transfers and switches. However, while in our baseline definition we consider that there 
is a transfer only when a new relationship is established after a branch closure when there is no 
other branch of that bank close by (in a 5 km radius), here we look at cases in which there is a 
closure but there is still at least another branch of that bank at most 1 km away from the firm. In 
this case, the switching discount reappears for the month immediately after the closure, i.e., these 
transfers are actually switches. This shows that our definition of transfer loans is strict enough to 
provide meaningful tests. 
Finally, in Appendix 22 we consider a different control group. Instead of comparing the transfer 
loans with all other similar loans being granted by the outside bank, we do this comparison for the 
branches of the outside bank that are not close to the areas where branches closed. This allows us 
to avoid concerns that the branches of the outside banks faced with more incoming borrowers pass 
on potential congestion costs to all their customers. The lack of discount after branch closure 
becomes even clearer. 
In further unreported regressions we re-run all exercises only for closures of branches by banks 
that were recapitalized with bailout funds (as these closures could even be more externally 
imposed and therefore even less encumbered than other closures). Results are most similar.38 
 
  
                                                 
38 In one specific date, one bank reports a large number of loans to the same firm. We believe that this might 
have been a reporting error. Because it is impossible for us to reject this conjecture, we repeat the analysis 
without these loans. The results are qualitatively the same. We opted to maintain these loans in the dataset 
to maintain its integrity. 
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Loan i  to Firm A
Loan ii to Firm A
Loan iii to Firm A
Loan iv to Firm A
Loan v to Firm A
Closest Branch of 
Bank 1 Closes
Figure 1. Switching loans, transfers, inside banks and outside banks. The figure above represents the relationships between firm A and five different banks. Before t=0 firm A has a
loan outstanding with Banks 1 and 2, the inside banks. At t=0 firm A establishes a relationship with Bank 3. Bank 3 is an outside bank because the firm did not have a relationship with Bank 3 in the
previous 12 months. Loans i and ii are nonswitching loans because these loans are granted by the inside banks. Loan iii is a switching loan because it is a new loan granted by an outside bank. Loan
iv given by Bank 4 is a transfer loan because the loan is a switching loan and it was given after the branch of an inside bank (say Bank 1) was closed. Loan 4 is also a first transfer loan. A subsequent
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Figure 2. Transfer loans given bank branch and firm location. The figure displays the branch of Bank 1 that is being closed and the location of the other bank branches. Transfer loans are switching loans granted in the period after the bank branch
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Figure 3. Residual maturity of relationships with the inside bank. The figure displays the
distribution of firms that switch banks according to the residual maturity of their inside bank
loans. When firms have more than one loan with the inside bank(s) we use the shortest residual
maturity.
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Figure 4. Switching vs. nonswitching loans at the switcher’s inside bank. The figure
displays the analysis in Table IV (Columns I and II), where we compare the loan rate of the
switching loan with comparable non-switching new loans from the switcher’s inside banks at
the time of the switch, as in Ioannidou and Ongena (2010). The loan granted by Bank 3 to Firm
A is the switching loan; all other loans are nonswitching loans.
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Figure 5. Switching vs. nonswitching loans at the switcher’s outside bank. The figure
displays the analysis in Table IV (Column III) and subsequent tables, where we compare the
rate of the switching loan with the rate of comparable nonswitching loans that the switcher’s
outside bank originates at the time of the switch, as in Ioannidou and Ongena (2010). The loan
granted by Bank 3 to Firm A is the switching loan; all other loans are nonswitching loans.
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Figure 6. ROC Curve for the Branch Closure Prediction Model The figure above
shows the ROC curve for the branch closure prediction probit model (appendix 2).
The AUC is 0.8070 and is significantly different from 0 at the 5% significance level.
We performed 1,000 replications and clustered at the branch level.
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Transfer Loans Nonswitching loans Switching loans
(n=1,129) (n=1,338,829) (n=24,292)
Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St. Dev. Median
Interest rate (in basis points) 536*** 233*** 521*** 755 368 643 609*** 268*** 546***
Risk indicator (100=default) 2.86*** 7.87*** 1.9*** 6.73 19.00 2.35 3.39*** 9.37*** 2.01***
Defaulted firm (in %) 0.53*** 7.27*** 0*** 3.37 18.00 0 0.663*** 8.11*** 0***
Limited company (in %) 74*** 43.9*** 100*** 67.60 46.80 100 80.3*** 39.8*** 100***
Public LLC (in %) 23.6*** 42.5*** 0*** 30.70 46.10 0 16.1*** 36.7*** 0***
Collateralized loan (in %) 59.9*** 49*** 100*** 37.90 48.50 0 66.1*** 47.3*** 100***
Loan maturity (months) 24.1*** 34.5*** 6.03*** 7.0 16.7 2.9 28.5*** 36*** 6.13***
Loan amount (in EUR) 107,924* 393,434* 25,000*** 57,347 960,996 9,000 102,721*** 596,717*** 25,000***
Amount of bank debt (in EUR) 1,051,500*** 2,281,304*** 312,336*** 3,266,369 12,000,435 597,851 848,602*** 3,563,670*** 89,486***
Floating rate loan (in %) 54.7*** 49.8*** 100*** 81.30 39.00 100 50.6*** 50*** 100***
Multiple relationships (in %) 86.40 34.3 100 86.80 33.90 100 61.8*** 48.6*** 100***
Primary lender (in %) 22.9*** 42.1*** 0*** 53.90 49.80 100 35.4*** 47.8*** 0***
Relationship with multiple products (in %) 21.2*** 40.9*** 0*** 84.30 36.40 100 18.5*** 38.8*** 0***
We report the mean, standard deviation, and median for selected loan and firm characteristics. The unit of observation in this table is the number (n) of loan initiations for transfer,
nonswitching and switching loans. We assess the differences in means of transfer or switching loans versus the nonswitching loans using the Student’s t-test. We assess the differences
in medians using the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test for continuous variables and the Pearson’s Chi-square test for categorical variables. We assess the differences in standard
deviations using Levene's test. We indicate whether the differences between the corresponding mean and median values are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels using ∗, ∗∗, and
∗∗∗, respectively.
Selected Characteristics of Transfer, Nonswitching and Switching Loans
Table I
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First transfer loans Later transfer loans
(n=870) (n=259)
Mean St. Dev. Median Mean St. Dev. Median
Interest rate (in basis points) 548*** 242** 526*** 496 198 496
Risk indicator (100=default) 3.02 8.27 1.95 2.38 6.47 1.73
Defaulted firm (in %) 0.57 7.56 0 0.39 6.21 0
Limited company (in %) 76.90*** 42.17*** 1*** 64.48 47.95 1
Public LLC (in %) 20.69*** 40.53*** 0*** 33.59 47.32 0
Collateralized loan (in %) 65.17*** 47.67*** 1*** 42.08 49.47 0
Loan maturity (months) 27.10*** 36.02*** 6.13*** 14.19 26.80 3.2
Loan amount (in EUR) 125,083*** 443,028*** 25,000*** 50.287 106,475 14,410
Amount of bank debt (in EUR) 935,381*** 2,459,220 206,073*** 1,441,552 1,478,350 932,026
Floating rate loan (in %) 49.89*** 50.03*** 0*** 71.04 45.44 1
Multiple relationships (in %) 82.99*** 37.59*** 1*** 97.68 15.07 1
Primary lender (in %) 25.52*** 43.62*** 0*** 14.29 35.06 0
Relationship with multiple products (in %) 18.97*** 39.23*** 0*** 28.57 45.26 0
We report the mean, standard deviation, and median for selected loan and firm characteristics. The unit of observation in this table is the
number (n) of loan initiations. Transfers are divided in first transfers (first switching loans after branch closure) and later transfers. We
assess the differences in means using the Student’s t-test. We assess the differences in medians using the Wilcoxon–Mann–Whitney test for
continuous variables and the Pearson’s Chi-square test for categorical variables. We assess the differences in standard deviations using
Levene's test. We indicate whether the differences between the corresponding mean and median values are significant at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels using ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗, respectively.
Table II
Selected Characteristics of First and Later Transfer Loans
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Category Matching variables # Possible values
Macro Quarter 13 2012q2 - 2015q2
Bank Inside bank 2 = 1 if the firm had a lending relationship with the bank in the last 12 months, and = 0 otherwise
Bank Outside bank 2 = 1 if the firm did not have a lending relationship with the bank in the last 12 months, and = 0 otherwise
Bank Foreign bank 2 =1 if bank is part of an international banking group, and = 0 otherwise
Bank Branch density 0 - ... number of branches per 1,000 adults
Firm Firm 94,281 =1 per firm identity, and = 0 otherwise
Firm Credit rating 6 = 1 if 1st (lowest) risk quartile, = 2 if 2nd risk quartile, = 3 if 3rd risk quartile, = 4 if 4th risk quartile, = 5 if defaulting firm, = 6
if firm without credit rating
Firm Region 20 Aveiro, Beja, Braga, Bragança, Castelo Branco, Coimbra, Faro, Funchal, Guarda, Leiria, Lisboa, Ponta Delgada, Portalegre,
Porto, Santarém, Setúbal, Viana do Castelo,Vila Real, Viseu, Évora
Firm Industry 13 Agriculture, forestry and fishing, mining and quarrying, manufacturing, utilities, construction, wholesale retail and trade,
transporting and storage, accomodation and food service activities, information and communication, real estate, finance and
insurance, professional/scientific/technical activities, other services.
Firm Legal structure 3 Sociedade por Quotas, Sociedade Anónima, other legal structure
Firm Multiple bank relationships 2 =1 if firm has multiple bank relationships
Firm Locality 308 County where firm is registered
Firm Size 4 =1 for micro firms =2 for small firms, =3 for medium-sized firms, =4 for large firms
Loan Collateral 2 =1 if loan is collateralized, and = 0 otherwise.
Loan Loan maturity 2 = 1 if the matched loans have similar maturity (using a (−30%, +30%) window), and = 0 otherwise
Loan Loan amount 2 = 1 if the matched loans have similar amount (using a (−30%, +30%) window), and = 0 otherwise
Loan Floating loan rate 2 = 1 if the interest rate on the loan varies more than 50% of the time, and = 0 otherwise
Table III
Matching variables
We report the number of possible values (#) and a range (or list) of values for the matching variables
E




I II III IV V
Matching Variables Benchmark Loose Matching
Quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Inside bank Yes Yes
Outside bank Yes Yes
Foreign bank Yes
Firm Yes
Credit rating Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal structure Yes Yes Yes Yes
Collateral Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan maturity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan amount Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Floating loan rate Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of switching or transfer loans 621 439 612 191 1,768
Number of nonswitching loans 4,232 2,469 2,497 312 362,387
Number of observations (matched pairs) 6,249 3,735 3,261 657 515,327
Rate difference
   Before branch closure (Switching) -90.21*** -90.51*** -62.81*** -212.53*** -52.12***
(18.48) (22.60) (23.66) (73.70) (19.13)
   1-6 months after closure (Transfer) -19.26 17.02 15.62 -62.24 -26.47
(41.24) (47.33) (29.55) (52.18) (20.39)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ inside bank (columns I, II and IV) and outside bank
(column III) when the closest branch of the inside bank closes. In columns I to III we consider other nonswitching loans given to other firms. In column IV we consider nonswitching loans given to the same
firm. All variables are defined in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each observation by one over the total number of comparable
nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
Table IV
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes
Main Matching Strategies
E




Period since the branch closure Before 1-6 months after 7-12 months after >12 months after
Number of switching / transfer loans 230 68 78 236
Number of nonswitching loans 878 295 338 986
Number of observations (matched pairs) 1,050 305 535 1,371
Interest rate difference with matching -62.81*** 15.62 -57.30* -94.21***
(23.66) (29.55) (33.85) (16.84)
Interest rate difference without matching -79.73*** -180.55*** -209.16*** -263.39***
(21.07) (29.88) (28.61) (21.78)
Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes, After More Than Six Months
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or first or later transfer loans and the interest rate on new nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when
the closest branch of the inside bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table IV. All variables are defined in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the
coefficient on the constant. We weigh each observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or first transfer loan. We cluster at the switching-firm level and
report robust standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
Transfer
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Panel A: First Transfer Loans
Number of switching / first transfer loans 230 62 39 155
Number of nonswitching loans 878 283 185 659
Number of observations (matched pairs) 1,050 289 235 783
Interest rate difference with matching -62.81*** 25.06 0.77 -96.89***
(23.66) (31.13) (25.38) (22.18)
Interest rate difference without matching -79.73*** -163.60*** -239.23*** -229.91***
(21.07) (30.83) (31.35) (26.63)
Panel B: Later Transfer Loans
Number of switching loans 230 6 39 81
Number of nonswitching loans 878 16 189 336
Number of observations (matched pairs) 1,050 16 300 588
Interest rate difference with matching -62.81*** -81.96 -115.38** -89.09***
(23.66) (74.82) (51.13) (24.20)
Interest rate difference without matching -79.73*** -355.67** -179.09*** -327.45***
(21.07) (90.54) (45.13) (26.11)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or first or later transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the inside bank
closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table IV. All variables are defined in Table III. We regress the
spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each observation by one over the total number of
comparable nonswitching loans per switching or first transfer loan. We cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust
standard errors between parentheses. We also report the difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or first
transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between
parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
First Transfer
Table VI
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or First and Later Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans 
Given by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes
E











Number of switching / first transfer loans 241 24 34 54
Number of nonswitching loans 8,091 893 1707 1396
Number of observations (matched pairs) 10,301 893 1,772 1,413
Interest rate difference with matching ‐52.50*** -92.97** -73.42** -33.58*
(19.86) (41.23) (31.65) (19.90)
Interest rate difference without matching ‐4.33 -246.03*** -195.81*** -293.56***
(29.15) (30.24) (43.95) (28.94)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or first transfer loans granted by other branches from the
inside bank that closes a branch and the interest rate on new nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside
bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the inside bank closes. We match on the variables from column V
of Table IV, on credit rating and on a variable that is equal to 1 if the credit relationship is more than 5 years old. All
variables are defined in Table III. We include only firms with risk category equal to 3 or lower. We regress the
spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each observation by one over the total
number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or first transfer loan. We cluster at the switching-firm level
and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the difference between the mean interest rate
on the switching or first transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the nonswitching loans in each column. We
report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-
tailed.
First Transfer within the Inside Bank
Table VII
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or First Transfer Loans, Given by Other Branches of the Inside 
Bank that Close a Branch, and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given by the Outside Bank When the Closest 
Branch of the Inside Bank Closes
E
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I II III IV V VI
Transfer loan -0.50 -0.36 -0.26 -1.00* -0.64 -0.45
(0.45) (0.46) (0.46) (0.61) (0.62) (0.62)
Credit rating, Province, Quarter, Economic
activity, Legal structure
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Interest rate No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 24,292 24,288 24,288 24,292 24,288 24,288
R-squared 0.00 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.03 0.04
Transfer loan -0.09 -0.04 -0.01 -1.19*** -1.07*** -0.98***
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.33) (0.34) (0.34)
Credit rating, Province, Quarter, Economic
activity, Legal structure
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Interest rate No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 24,292 24,288 24,288 24,292 24,288 24,288
R-squared 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03
After 1 Year After 2 Years
The table distinguishes between switching and transfer loans with respect to their default probability and loan loss rate. In Panel A the dependent
variable equals one if the firm defaults at the firm-bank level one or two year after the switching or transfer event. In Panel B the dependent variable
equals the share of the outstanding amount in default for all firm-bank pairs one and two years after the switching or transfer event. All models include
a constant. We report robust standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
Table VIII
Default Rate for Firms that Switch and Transfer
Panel A: The Firm Defaults on the Loan 1 or 2 Years After Switch or Transfer
Panel B: The Loss Rate on the Loan 1 or 2 Years After Switch or Transfer
After 1 Year After 2 Years
E








Amount outstanding (EUR Million) -0.0005* -0.0006*
(0.0002) (0.0001)
Percentage of defaulted loans (>=1 month) 0.0021 0.0015
(0.0016) (0.0026)
Branch density 0.0100*** 0.0255***
(0.0035) (0.0035)
Observations 369,131 304,641
County dummies Yes Yes
Bank-time dummies Yes No
Time dummies No Yes
Bank dummies No Yes
We assess the probability that branches close in a given month. We regress a
dummy variable that marks whether each branch closes in a given month on the
variables defined below. Branch density refers to the number of branches per
1,000 adults. We use separate linear probability and probit specifications. We
cluster at the bank level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. ∗,
∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
Table IX
Probability of Branch Closure
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Switching







Number of switching / transfer loans 31 15 12 123
Number of nonswitching loans 211 100 67 613
Number of observations (matched pairs) 255 106 84 796
Interest rate difference with matching -64.74** 10.54 -137.31** -65.43***
(27.71) (54.96) (41.96) (22.81)
Interest rate difference without matching -166.54*** -165.17** 45.73 -118.97
(42.18) (69.93) (138.45) (126.84)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new nonswitching loans
obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the inside bank closes. We use the
estimates of the probability of branch closures to divide transfers in three quantiles and use only transfers from branches that are
the least likely to close. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table IV. All variables are defined in Table III.
We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each observation by one over the total
number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust
standard errors between parentheses. We also report the difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer
loans and the mean interest rate on the nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗,
and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
Transfer
 Table X
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given by the Outside 
Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes - Unlikely Branch Closures
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Type of transfer All transfers First transfers Later transfers
Number of switching / transfer loans 612 486 356
Number of nonswitching loans 2,497 2,005 1,419
Number of observations (matched pairs) 3,261 2,357 1,954
Switching discount -62.81*** -62.81*** -62.81***
(23.62) (23.63) (23.66)
Transfer 1-6 months after 78.43** 87.87** -19.15
(37.68) (38.91) (72.48)
Transfer 7-12 months after 5.51 63.58* -52.57
(40.92) (34.19) (54.79)
Transfer >12 months after -31.40 -34.08 -26.28
(28.99) (32.37) (33.65)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on
new nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the
closest branch of the inside bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of
Table IV. All variables are defined in Table III. We create a categorical variable to classify loan
transfers. Categories are: switching loans that occur before the branch closure; loan transfers 1 to 6
months after the closure; loan transfers 7 to 12 months after the closure; loan transfers more than 12
months after the closure. We regress the spreads on a constant and on the categorical variable, and
report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each observation by one over the total number of
comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We cluster at the switching-firm
level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the difference between
the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the
nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
Table XI
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans
E











Number of switching / first transfer loans 68 14 10 36
Number of nonswitching loans 121 28 21 56
Number of observations (matched pairs) 220 34 67 75
Interest rate difference with matching -212.53*** -62.24 -161.24** -146.62***
(73.70) (52.18) (30.89) (40.32)
Interest rate difference without matching -263.61*** -131.02** -243.62*** -275.54***
(20.28) (54.97) (25.57) (26.51)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or first transfer loans and the interest rate on new nonswitching
loans obtained by the same firm when the closest branch of the inside bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in
Column IV of Table IV and exclude nonswitching loans from the outside bank. All variables are defined in Table III. We
regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each observation by one over the
total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or first transfer loan. We cluster at the switching-firm level
and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the difference between the mean interest rate on the
switching or first transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard
errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
First Transfer
Table XII
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or First Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given to 
the Same Firm When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank ClosesE











Number of switching loans 68 0 21 42
Number of nonswitching loans 121 0 37 66
Number of observations (matched pairs) 220 0 70 191
Constant -212.53*** n.a. -76.67** -119.40**
(73.70) n.a. (25.46) (50.29)
Interest rate difference without matching -226.78*** n.a. -247.51*** -293.98***
(26.80) n.a. (37.20) (69.66)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or later transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained by the same firm when the closest branch of the inside bank closes. We match on the
variables indicated in Column IV of Table IV and exclude nonswitching loans from the outside bank. All variables
are defined in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh
each observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or later transfer loan.
We cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the
difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or later transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the
nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
Later Transfer
Table XIII
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Later Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans 
Given to the Same Firm When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank ClosesE




Period since the branch closure Before 1-6 months after 7-12 months after >12 months after
Panel A: Matching also on a Multiple Bank Relationship 
Dummy
Number of switching / transfer loans 191 56 73 202
Number of nonswitching loans 708 186 311 858
Number of observations (matched pairs) 860 194 506 1,222
Interest rate difference with matching -47.85* 1.07 -60.39* -90.61***
(26.24) (34.25) (35.66) (17.69)
Interest rate difference without matching -101.84*** -121.10*** -211.60*** -208.56**
(24.80) (39.06) (51.98) (81.25)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new nonswitching loans obtained from the
switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the inside bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of
Table IV. All variables are defined in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each
observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We cluster at the switching-firm level and
report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer loans and
the mean interest rate on the nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
Transfer
Table XIV
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given by the Outside Bank When the 
Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes: Bank-Firm RelationshipsElectronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com
/abstract=
2749155
I II III IV
Rate Collateralized loans Maturity Loan amount
Quarter, bank, credit rating, region, industry, legal structure, floating loan rate Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan rate Yes Yes Yes
Collateral Yes Yes Yes
Loan maturity Yes Yes Yes
Loan amount Yes Yes Yes
Number of transfer loans 146 125 158 207
Number of nonswitching loans 633 549 856 1,736
Number of observations (matched pairs) 840 786 1,306 2,903
-23.34 -0.08* -0.46 -12,365.28
(24.40) (0.05) (1.52) (8,804.40)
Number of first transfer loans 101 87 113 143
Number of nonswitching loans 468 403 652 1,325
Number of observations (matched pairs) 524 495 837 1,618
15.68 -0.09 -0.96 -7,630.12
(21.44) (0.06) (2.10) (12,179.94)
Number of later transfer loans 45 38 45 64
Number of nonswitching loans 205 206 295 560
Number of observations (matched pairs) 316 291 469 1,285
-110.92** -0.06 0.79 -22,945.40***
(45.39) (0.05) (1.06) (7,820.51)
Table XV
Differences in Loan Conditions on Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given by the Outside Bank
Difference in loan conditions (at time of the later transfer loan)
In Panel A, we assess the difference in each loan condition on transfer loans (i.e., switching loan after the closest branch of the inside bank closes) and the loan condition on new nonswitching loans obtained
(by other firms) from the switchers’ outside bank. In Panel B we repeat the analysis of Panel A only for the first transfers after the branch closure. In Panel C we do the analysis for the remaining later
transfers. We match on the indicated variables (similar to the benchmark model in Column III of Table IV). The variables are defined in Table III. Loans for the panels A, B and C span between the 1st and
12th month after closure. We regress the difference in each loan condition on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors
between parentheses. ∗,∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
Panel A: Transfer loans
Difference in loan conditions (at time of the transfer loan)
Panel B: First transfers
Difference in loan conditions (at time of the first trasnfer loan)
Panel C: Later transfers
E
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% Loans Same 
Bank
% Loans Same 
Bank and 
Other Banks
% No New 
Loans
1 7.75 2.75 1.27 88.23
2 10.33 3.53 2.17 83.97
3 11.56 4.35 2.84 81.26
4 13.08 4.50 3.29 79.13
5 14.20 5.06 3.62 77.13
6 14.93 5.70 4.09 75.27
7 15.45 5.90 4.63 74.03
8 16.05 6.09 5.06 72.80
9 16.33 6.22 5.42 72.02
10 16.72 6.41 5.77 71.10
11 17.06 6.46 6.22 70.26
12 17.17 6.52 6.50 69.81
Financial system 
(firm-month pairs)
3.23 5.67 0.04 91.06
In this table we look at firms that are affected by the closure of a bank branch. In the
first column we calculate the percentage of fims that get a new loan from a bank
other than the bank that closes its branch. In the second column we show the
percentage of firms that get a loan from the bank that closed its branch. In the third
column we show the percentage of firms that get a loan from the bank that closes its
branch, as well as from other banks. In the fourth column we show the percentage of
firms that do not get a new loan. Rows represent the number of months passed since
the branch closure. Values are cumulative.
Outcomes for Firms that Are Affected by Branch Closure
Table XVI
E
lectronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com
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Period since the branch closure Before 1-6 months after 7-12 months after >12 months after
Number of switching / transfer loans 10,484 5,347 1,919 4,544
Number of nonswitching loans 32,351 10,367 4,831 9,339
Number of observations (matched pairs) 180,303 195,094 18,062 20,304
Interest rate difference with matching 7.00 5.81 -1.41 1.28
(0.11) (0.26) (0.80) (0.69)
Interest rate difference without matching 105.15*** -5.38 10.94 -83.62***
(12.64) (14.83) (17.20) (11.56)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on new loans obtained from the transferers' inside bank when the closest branch of the inside
bank closes and other loans that the inside bank gives to firms not affected by branch closures. We match on the variables indicated in
Column III of Table IV. All variables are defined in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the
constant. We weigh each observation by one over the total number of comparable loans per loan to an affected firm. We cluster at the
switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the difference between the mean interest rate on
the loans to affected firms and the mean interest rate on loans to other firms in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
Table XVII










Closing bank -0.20 3.90
(0.47) (2.45)
1-6 months after transfer 0.15 0.11
(0.13) (4.56)
7-12 months after transfer 0.22 2.02
(0.15) (6.30)
>12 months after transfer 0.25 9.09
(0.17) (9.65)
Closing bank * 1-6 months after transfer -1.84** -5.02
(0.76) (6.59)
Closing bank * 7-12 months after transfer -1.76 2.17
(0.98) (17.04)




Time FE Yes Yes
Location FE Yes Yes
Bank FE Yes Yes
Table XVIII
Columns I and II are linear probability models. In the first column the dependent variable is equal to 1 if
bank i does at least one credit profile download of a firm located in zipcode j. In the second column the
dependent variable is the total amount of new loans given by bank i to firms located in zipcode j . The
independent variable “Closing bank” is equal to 1 if zipcode j is at most 5 kilometers away from a closing
branch of bank i . We create a categorical variable to classify loan transfers. Categories are: period before
the branch closure; 1 to 6 months after the closure; 7 to 12 months after the closure; more than 12 months
after the closure. In column 2 we exclude bank-period pairs before December 2014 when smaller banks do
not have to report new loans. Only zipcodes with branch closures within 5 kilometers are included. We
cluster at the zipcode level and report robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
New Loans and Credit Profile Downloads at the Bank-Zipcode Level in Transfer Areas
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1-6 months after transfer 0.92 -25.41
(1.54) (48.31)
7-12 months after transfer 0.60 -6.68
(2.05) (95.42)




Time FE Yes Yes
Location FE Yes Yes
Table XIX
Columns I and II are linear probability models. In the first column the dependent
variable is the number of firms with credit profile downloads in month i and zipcode
j. In the second column the dependent variable is the total amount of new loans given
to firms located in zipcode j in month i . We create a categorical variable to classify
loan transfers. Categories are: period before the branch closure; 1 to 6 months after
the closure; 7 to 12 months after the closure; more than 12 months after the closure.
In column 2 we exclude banks that do not have to report new loans before December
2014. Only zipcodes with branch closures within 5 kilometers are included. We
cluster at the zipcode level and report robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗,
and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
New Loans and Credit Profile Downloads at the Zipcode Level in Transfer 
Areas
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2749155
(1)
Firm Affected by Closure, 1-6 months after closure 0.28
(0.18)
Firm Affected by Closure, 7-12 months after closure 0.25
(0.22)







This table measures the probability of getting a new loan for firms affected
by branch closures. We create a categorical variable to classify loan
transfers. Categories are: period before the branch closure; 1 to 6 months
after the closure; 7 to 12 months after the closure; more than 12 months
after the closure. We cluster at the firm level and report robust standard
errors in parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, two-tailed.
Probability of Getting a New LoanE
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Other Figures
Internet Appendix Number Issue Analyze ... Operationalization IV V VI VII Table
0 All Switching all switching loans irrepespective of branch closings all switching we observe to make results comparable to earlier work Y
1 Competition areas where the hypothetical closure of a branch should have a
negligible impact on competition
only firms served by branches that witness a minor change in HHI which is
below 25
Y Y Y Y
2 Competition if discounts are being generated by an increase in competition after
branch closure
only small banks (excluding banks when ranked nationally that represent 80%
of credit market share) within highly competitive areas (HHI below 1,500)
Y
3 Competition if the effect on interest rates is not being driven by changes in local
competition
control for changes in the HHI Y
4 Firm Quality if differences in firm quality drive our main results only firms that have a probability of default below the median Y
5 Firm Quality if differences in firm quality drive our main results only firms with a probability of default above the median Y
6 Matching if matching strategy drives main results match switching loans on county instead of province Y
7 Matching if matching strategy drives main results match on branch density (number of branches in the county per 1,000 adults) Y
8 Matching if matching strategy drives main results use categorical firm size variable as an additional matching variable Y
9 Matching useage of a much stricter matching strategy match transfer firms with switching firms arriving at the same bank Y
10 Matching useage of a looser matching strategy loosen the matching strategy along a few dimensions, namely collateral, legal
structure of the firms and fixed vs floating interest rates
Y
11 Matching the variable by variable relaxation of the matching strategy exclude one matching variable at a time Y
12 Matching a different matching strategy use a propensity score matching algorithm Y
13 Calendar Time Period if reporting requirements matter exclude the period starting in December 2014 after which all banks had to
report loan rates
Y
14 Region if regional differences in distance play a role exclude Lisbon and Porto Y
15 Branch Closure Time if closure is anticipated include the month of the branch closure and the month before the branch
closure in the post-transfer period
Y
16 Branch Closure Specificity if results are not driven by a few special loans take only branch closures that lead to more than 10 transfers Y
17 Refinancing Needs if firms` refinancing needs matter for the reuslts only firms that had to refinance a loan within 90 days after branch closure Y
18 Information Asymmetry if results are not driven by the degree of information asymmetry only for the most opaque firms (defined as those with fewer than 10 employees,
and turnover or assets below €2 million, located in areas with branch density
below the median)
Y
19 Over Time what happens to switchers over time study interest ratew at oustide bank afterwards for those that stay Y
20 Over Time what happens to transferers over time study interest ratew at oustide bank afterwards for those that stay Y
21 Placebo if proximity of another bank branch of the bank that closes the branch
matters
look at cases in which there is a closure but there is still at least another branch
of that bank at most 1 km away from the firm
Y
22 Control Group if outside banks faced with more incoming borrowers pass on potential
congestion costs to all their customers
use only other similar loans being granted by branches of the outside bank that
are not close to the areas where branches closed
Y
Statistics Reports the distribution of switching and transfer loans by industry and by region
Data
Replicates Tables
Internet Appendix: Table of Contents
Reports the Number of Banks, Branches, Branch Density, and Number of Firms per Municipality
E




Matching Variables I II III IV
Quarter Yes Yes Yes Yes




Credit rating Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Legal structure Yes Yes Yes Yes
Collateral Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan maturity Yes Yes Yes Yes
Loan amount Yes Yes Yes Yes
Floating loan rate Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of switching loans 6,265 4,231 6,931 1,639
Number of nonswitching loans 31,560 20,531 23,892 3,382
Number of observations (matched pairs) 50,915 28,181 33,274 7,717
Interest rate difference with matching -122.37*** -88.96*** -58.53*** -91.93***
(-7.87) (7.00) (4.60) (12.37)
Interest rate difference without matching -149.07*** -107.83*** -53.28*** -64.67**
(8.25) (9.01) (8.60) (31.56)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained (by other firms) from the switchers’ set of inside banks in
Column I and II and from the switchers’ set of outside bank in Column III. In Column IV we
compare the rate of switching loans with the rate of non-switching loans obtained by the same
firm, excluding non-switching loans given by the outside bank. We match on the indicated
variables. All variables are defined in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and
report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each observation by one over the total number
of comparable nonswitching loans per switching loan. We cluster at the switching-firm level
and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the difference between
the mean interest rate on the switching loans and the mean interest rate on the nonswitching
loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
Appendix 0 Table IV
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans 
Given by Inside or Outside Banks Not Conditioning on Branch Closures
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2749155
Appendix 1 Figure 1. Impact of closing a branch on market competition. The figure
displays the impact of closing a branch on the bank branch Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).
The x-axis shows the percentiles of change in HHI. The y-axis shows the change in HHI for
each percentile.
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Appendix 1 Figure 2. Variation in
branch density per municipality. The 
figure above shows the variation in
branch density between June 2012 and
May 2015 per municipality.
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2749155
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Number of switching / transfer loans 94 35 39 78
Number of nonswitching loans 322 110 129 244
Number of observations (matched pairs) 396 120 252 423
Interest rate difference with matching -66.67 12.08 -97.58* -139.84***
(47.75) (39.97) (49.23) (24.49)
Interest rate difference without matching -89.59** -122.81*** -260.41*** -276.45***
(35.99) (42.56) (35.41) (32.24)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the
inside bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table A1 IV. All variables are defined
in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each
observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We
cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the
difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the
nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
Transfer
Appendix 1 Table IV
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given 
by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes - Areas Where Branch Closure 
Has Low Impact on CompetitionE










Number of switching / first transfer loans 94 31 16 38
Number of nonswitching loans 322 105 51 133
Number of observations (matched pairs) 396 111 101 160
Interest rate difference with matching -66.67 24.05 -1.78 -128.45***
(47.75) (42.96) (26.01) (42.36)
Interest rate difference without matching -89.59** -112.02** -308.21*** -218.86***
(35.99) (43.58) (65.82) (15.20)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or first transfer loans and the interest rate on
new nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch
of the inside bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table A1 IV. All variables
are defined in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We
weigh each observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or
first transfer loan. We cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between
parentheses. We also report the difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or first transfer
loans and the mean interest rate on the nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors
between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
First Transfer
Appendix 1 Table VI
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or First Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching 
Loans Given by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes - Areas Where 
Branch Closure Has Low Impact on Competition
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Number of switching loans 94 4 23 40
Number of nonswitching loans 322 9 102 102
Number of observations (matched pairs) 396 9 151 263
Interest rate difference with matching -66.67 -80.67 -164.22** -150.67***
(47.75) (94.10) (51.33) (27.34)
Interest rate difference without matching -89.59** -252.25* -227.19*** -345.13***
(35.99) (101.93) (19.72) (40.10)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or later transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the
inside bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table A1 IV. All variables are defined
in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each
observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or later transfer loan.
We cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the
difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or later transfer loans and the mean interest rate on
the nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
Later Transfer
Appendix 1 Table VII
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Later Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans 
Given by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes - Areas Where Branch 
Closure Has Low Impact on CompetitionE










Number of switching / transfer loans 31 14 16 28
Number of nonswitching loans 45 31 22 60
Number of observations (matched pairs) 52 36 39 90
Interest rate difference with matching -205.39** 69.63 -173.31** -158.57***
(92.21) (70.67) (64.16) (38.30)
Interest rate difference without matching 3.76 -38.28 -363.15* -265.70***
(61.17) (126.67) (131.10) (48.84)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the
inside bank closes. We exclude outside banks with the highest market share that represent up to 80% of all loans.
We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table IV. All variables are defined in Table III. We regress
the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each observation by one over the
total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We cluster at the switching-firm
level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the difference between the mean
interest rate on the switching or transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the nonswitching loans in each
column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, two-tailed.
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Appendix 2 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given 
by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes - High Competition Areas, Small 
Banks
E











Number of switching / transfer loans 230 68 78 236
Number of nonswitching loans 878 295 338 986
Number of observations (matched pairs) 1,050 305 535 1,371
Constant -48.90* 30.14 -107.52** -99.74***
(29.20) (36.94) (42.28) (19.15)
Δ HHI -0.14 -0.11 0.90** 0.01
(0.11) (0.55) (0.36) (0.13)
Δ HHI^2 0.00 -0.00 -0.00*** 0.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the
inside bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table IV. All variables are defined in
Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. Δ HHI is the variation
in the Herfindahl index between month t-1 and month t. The index is calculated using the number of branches in
a 5 kilometer radius. We weigh each observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans
per switching or transfer loan. We cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between
parentheses. We also report the difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer loans and
the mean interest rate on the nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
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Appendix 3 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given 
by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes - Impact of Changes in HHI on 
Interest Rates
E











Number of switching / transfer loans 135 54 63 201
Number of nonswitching loans 578 224 258 794
Number of observations (matched pairs) 719 232 438 1,123
Interest rate difference with matching -27.58 22.61 -56.77 -95.08***
(21.22) (31.20) (36.68) (17.00)
Interest rate difference without matching -52.72* -108.22*** -204.06*** -221.67***
(28.68) (30.17) (28.12) (20.46)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the
inside bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table A8 IV. All variables are defined
in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each
observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We
cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the
difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the
nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
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Appendix 4 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given 
by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes  - Sample Split: Better than 










Number of switching / transfer loans 95 14 15 35
Number of nonswitching loans 300 71 80 192
Number of observations (matched pairs) 331 73 97 248
Interest rate difference with matching -112.86** -11.35 -59.54 -89.18
(46.48) (78.57) (90.36) (59.00)
Interest rate difference without matching -181.45*** -104.17 -92.58 117.42
(31.54) (64.15) (123.81) (248.10)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the
inside bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table IV. All variables are defined in
Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each
observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We
cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the
difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the
nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
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Appendix 5 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given 
by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes  - Sample Split: Worse than 
Median Rating
E










Number of switching / transfer loans 117 33 55 142
Number of nonswitching loans 308 91 305 361
Number of observations (matched pairs) 386 96 617 576
Interest rate difference with matching -128.37*** -74.13 -170.93** -67.70***
(42.36) (51.51) (67.50) (24.87)
Interest rate difference without matching -106.63*** -120.33** -248.35*** -277.08***
(38.70) (44.75) (14.11) (33.24)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the
inside bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table A6 IV. All variables are defined
in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each
observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We
cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the
difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the
nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
Transfer
Appendix 6 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given 
by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes - Matching on County
E










Number of switching / transfer loans 172 45 65 176
Number of nonswitching loans 531 170 217 610
Number of observations (matched pairs) 655 173 333 793
Interest rate difference with matching -79.11*** -17.99 -65.06*** -84.93***
(28.07) (39.24) (19.12) (22.38)
Interest rate difference without matching -124.00*** -110.82*** -207.18*** -175.17
(26.39) (36.81) (75.00) (107.35)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the
inside bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table A7 IV. All variables are defined
in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each
observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We
cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the
difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the
nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
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Appendix 7 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given 
by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes - Matching on Branch Density
E










Number of switching / transfer loans 156 4 26 65
Number of nonswitching loans 425 9 91 177
Number of observations (matched pairs) 474 9 133 305
Interest rate difference with matching -69.35*** -42.34 -173.09*** -54.57**
(24.30) (79.14) (30.68) (23.60)
Interest rate difference without matching -95.05*** -274.67*** -250.38*** -338.37***
(25.53) (30.60) (19.11) (36.64)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the
inside bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table A8 IV. All variables are defined
in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each
observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We
cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the
difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the
nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
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Appendix 8 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given 
by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes - Matching on Firm Size
E










Number of switching / transfer loans 30 10 8 33
Number of nonswitching loans 36 12 8 38
Number of observations (matched pairs) 37 12 9 41
Interest rate difference with matching 36.38 9.11 114.01* 15.30
(46.32) (61.21) (54.45) (29.40)
Interest rate difference without matching 97.05*** 42.28 -103.03 -60.84*
(34.29) (83.02) (59.90) (32.64)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new
switching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the inside
bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table IV. All variables are defined in Table III.
We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each observation by
one over the total number of comparable switching non-transfer loans per switching or transfer loan. We cluster
at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the difference
between the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the nonswitching
loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
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Appendix 9 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Switching Loans Given by 
the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank ClosesE











Number of switching / transfer loans 50 16 12 59
Number of nonswitching loans 61 19 15 67
Number of observations (matched pairs) 63 19 16 79
Interest rate difference with matching 16.37 -16.54 132.87** -41.83
(29.59) (52.51) (40.71) (29.70)
Interest rate difference without matching 35.41 -4.75 -64.11 -111.74***
(24.68) (60.35) (53.20) (27.58)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new switching
loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the inside bank closes. We
match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table IV, except that in this specification we do not distinguish
collateralized loans, firms according to their legal structure (limited liability companies vs. joint-stock companies), and
floating rate loans. All variables are defined in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the
coefficient on the constant. We weigh each observation by one over the total number of comparable switching non-
transfer loans per switching or transfer loan. We cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors
between parentheses. We also report the difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer loans
and the mean interest rate on the nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
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Appendix 10 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Switching Loans Given by the 
Inside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Outside Bank Closes - Looser Matching
E










Initial values (table V) -62.81*** 15.62 -57.30* -94.21***
(23.66) (29.55) (33.85) (16.84)
Credit rating -66.51*** -40.79 -58.90** -87.43***
(14.23) (29.36) (22.93) (12.59)
Province -55.47*** -48.37** -66.26** -75.21***
(12.90) (23.03) (29.46) (11.23)
Activity -49.26*** -34.05 -57.13*** -96.51***
(13.90) (25.77) (21.19) (12.93)
Legal structure -68.22*** -4.89 -109.30*** -74.27***
(17.43) (34.65) (27.73) (13.25)
Collateral dummy -56.28*** -11.03 -70.13** -99.66***
(17.99) (28.14) (27.49) (14.36)
Floating rate dummy -56.55*** 10.04 -58.84** -90.02***
(18.84) (29.99) (25.81) (14.57)
Amount -76.58*** -87.46*** -68.25*** -103.85***
(15.79) (26.46) (21.17) (12.25)
Maturity -63.82*** -29.37 -112.99*** -104.02***
(16.68) (27.01) (28.51) (12.79)
We assess the impact of matching variables on the interest rate differential between transfers and comparable
loans from the outside bank. We use the matching procedure from Table V to compare interest rates of loan
transfers against comparable loans given by the outside bank to other firms. We remove one variable at a time
from the matching algorithm and compute the interest rate differences. The first column indicates the name of
the variable we exclude from the matching procedure. We cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust
standard errors between parentheses. We also report the difference between the mean interest rate on the
switching or transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the nonswitching loans in each column. We report




Impact of Matching Variables on the Interest Rate Difference Between Transfers and Loans from the 
Outside Bank
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Number of observations (matched pairs) 670 261 202 663
Interest rate difference with matching -51.80*** -44.72 -92.08*** -93.94***
(17.20) (28.57) (24.64) (17.12)
Interest rate difference without matching -119.51*** -101.43*** -177.67*** -193.29***
(14.00) (21.29) (16.58) (14.15)
We assess the spread between the interest rate premia on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the
inside bank closes. Interest rate premia is calculated by subtracting the average interest rate for firms from the
loan rate at the month of the loan. We match the closest observation in the control group on the variables
indicated in Column III of Table IV. All variables are defined in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant
and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each observation by one over the total number of
comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We cluster at the switching-firm level and report
robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the difference between the mean interest rate on the
switching or transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the nonswitching loans in each column. We report
standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-
tailed.
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Appendix 12 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rate Premia on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans 
Given by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes - Propensity Score 
Matching
E










Number of switching / transfer loans 208 36 47 158
Number of nonswitching loans 800 202 179 673
Number of observations (matched pairs) 964 209 266 960
Interest rate difference with matching -75.22*** 11.79 -56.12 -107.57***
(23.74) (46.07) (56.05) (21.43)
Interest rate difference without matching -126.08*** -120.28*** -140.31 -138.17
(23.88) (42.83) (95.43) (111.40)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the
inside bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table A16 IV. All variables are defined
in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each
observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We
cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the
difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the
nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
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Appendix 13 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given 
by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes Before December 2014
E










Number of switching / transfer loans 125 43 48 161
Number of nonswitching loans 497 210 213 571
Number of observations (matched pairs) 591 217 304 833
Interest rate difference with matching -90.80*** 10.60 -72.38 -94.30***
(32.93) (37.58) (50.84) (18.56)
Interest rate difference without matching -135.60*** -132.92*** -147.44 -299.99***
(29.33) (37.57) (90.32) (25.70)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the
inside bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table A17 IV. All variables are defined
in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each
observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We
cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the
difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the
nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
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Appendix 14 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given 
by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes Outside Lisbon and Porto
E










Number of switching / transfer loans 251 67 94 206
Number of nonswitching loans 1,036 305 481 782
Number of observations (matched pairs) 1,215 323 713 1,120
Interest rate difference with matching -65.06*** 17.47 -90.19** -86.80***
(22.10) (29.10) (34.93) (15.85)
Interest rate difference without matching -120.82*** -150.85*** -39.28 -284.54***
(25.61) (33.37) (147.66) (20.31)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the
inside bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table IV. All variables are defined in
Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each
observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We
cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the
difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the
nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
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Appendix 15 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given 
by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes  - Month Before Transfer Within 










Number of switching / transfer loans 142 37 62 145
Number of nonswitching loans 622 211 262 597
Number of observations (matched pairs) 779 218 459 897
Interest rate difference with matching -44.34 43.45 -66.32 -105.71***
(34.43) (41.29) (39.01) (20.11)
Interest rate difference without matching -62.54** -170.17*** -206.60*** -305.53***
(30.54) (43.67) (32.49) (21.39)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the
inside bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table IV. All variables are defined in
Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each
observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We
cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the
difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the
nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
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Appendix 16 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given 
by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes - Only Branches with More than 










Number of switching / transfer loans 77 24 52 109
Number of nonswitching loans 329 114 244 522
Number of observations (matched pairs) 389 118 429 730
Interest rate difference with matching -88.88* 72.29 -94.70** -114.81***
(51.84) (51.44) (42.34) (27.86)
Interest rate difference without matching -123.11*** -158.58** -189.77*** -221.28***
(31.03) (63.32) (36.78) (40.28)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the
inside bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table IV. All variables are defined in
Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each
observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We
cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the
difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the
nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
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Appendix 17 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given 
by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes - Firms That Have to Refinance 
Loans in Less Than 90 Days
E










Number of switching / transfer loans 230 68 78 236
Number of nonswitching loans 878 295 338 986
Number of observations (matched pairs) 1,050 305 535 1,371
Opaque Firm Dummy 64.68 -9.51 54.57 17.90
(45.96) (59.41) (53.19) (36.99)
Constant -90.65*** 20.24 -71.29* -99.22***
(30.49) (40.02) (42.09) (19.92)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the
inside bank closes. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table IV. Opaque firms are small firms
(fewer than 50 employees and turnover and assets below €10 million) in areas with branch density below the
median. All variables are defined in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on
the constant. We weigh each observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per
switching or transfer loan. We cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between
parentheses. We also report the difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer loans and
the mean interest rate on the nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses.
∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
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Appendix 18 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given 
by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes - Opaque Firms
E














Number of switching / transfer loans 6,931 4,132 5,403 4,732 4,227 14,124
Number of nonswitching loans 23,892 16,669 20,933 17,619 14,811 37,390
Number of observations (matched pairs) 33,274 30,449 35,557 27,534 23,992 82,833
Interest rate difference with matching -58.53*** -82.13*** -43.58*** -29.84*** -19.87** -10.13
(4.60) (8.94) (8.78) (9.80) (9.92) (11.80)
Interest rate difference without matching -149.83*** -160.17*** -100.58*** -82.28*** -112.51*** -154.13***
(5.17) (11.07) (13.29) (12.38) (16.03) (15.27)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching loans and subsequent loans given by the outside bank to the switching firm and the
interest rate on new nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the inside bank
closes. Subsequent loans are loans given by the outside bank after the firm switches. We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table
IV. All variables are defined in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each
observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We cluster at the switching-firm level
and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer
loans and the mean interest rate on the nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
Loans after switching loan
Appendix 19 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching Loans and Subsequent Loans Obtained by Switching Firms at the Outside Bank and 
Matched Nonswitching Loans Given by the Outside Bank
E
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Number of switching / transfer loans 68 27 53 48 43 235
Number of nonswitching loans 295 181 360 128 186 864
Number of observations (matched pairs) 305 216 785 167 332 1,350
Interest rate difference with matching 15.62 -43.90 -5.39 -91.90 -7.20 -80.06
(29.55) (37.87) (56.67) (114.45) (31.57) (50.07)
Interest rate difference without matching -180.55*** -146.14*** -35.06 -110.97 -88.53* -234.89***
(29.88) (45.08) (48.16) (76.04) (47.90) (59.79)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on transfer loans and subsequent loans given by the outside bank to the switching firm and the
interest rate on new nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the inside bank
closes. Subsequent loans are loans given by the outside bank after the firm transfers to a new bank. We match on the variables indicated in
Column III of Table IV. All variables are defined in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We
weigh each observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We cluster at the switching-
firm level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or
transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
Loans after switching loan
Appendix 20 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Loan Transfers up to Six Months After Closure and Subsequent Loans Obtained by Firms at the 
Outside Bank and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given by the Outside Bank
E










Number of switching / transfer loans 51 23 30 132
Number of nonswitching loans 158 122 78 599
Number of observations (matched pairs) 163 129 83 747
Interest rate difference with matching -77.44** -158.94** -121.68 -100.88***
(32.86) (64.19) (78.04) (20.17)
Interest rate difference without matching -97.19*** -178.96** -194.82*** -190.06***
(32.24) (62.91) (27.46) (16.04)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the
inside bank closes. We select areas where there is an alternative branch to the closing branch of the inside bank at
most 1 km away from the firm.We match on the variables indicated in Column III of Table IV. All variables are
defined in Table III. We regress the spreads on a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh
each observation by one over the total number of comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan.
We cluster at the switching-firm level and report robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the
difference between the mean interest rate on the switching or transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the
nonswitching loans in each column. We report standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-tailed.
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Appendix 21 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given 
by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes - Placebo Testing
E











Number of switching / transfer loans 200 58 67 203
Number of nonswitching loans 642 218 245 712
Number of observations (matched pairs) 759 220 377 1,019
Interest rate difference with matching -49.01** -19.85 -34.99 -94.31***
(20.77) (33.33) (24.35) (18.86)
Interest rate difference without matching -91.60*** -188.87*** -240.24*** -278.48***
(21.70) (33.24) (27.80) (23.95)
We assess the spread between the interest rate on switching or transfer loans and the interest rate on new
nonswitching loans obtained from the switchers’ outside bank (by other firms) when the closest branch of the
inside bank closes. We exclude branches from all banks that are the closest to areas affected by branch closures.
For each firm that is affected by branch closures, we identify the closest branch for all banks in the country. We
then exclude all branches that are the closest to at least one firm that is affected by branch closures. We match on
the variables indicated in Column III of Table IV. All variables are defined in Table III. We regress the spreads on
a constant and report the coefficient on the constant. We weigh each observation by one over the total number of
comparable nonswitching loans per switching or transfer loan. We cluster at the switching-firm level and report
robust standard errors between parentheses. We also report the difference between the mean interest rate on the
switching or transfer loans and the mean interest rate on the nonswitching loans in each column. We report
standard errors between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, two-
tailed.
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Appendix 22 Table V
Spreads between Interest Rates on Switching or Transfer Loans and Matched Nonswitching Loans Given 
by the Outside Bank When the Closest Branch of the Inside Bank Closes – Excluding All Branches that 
Are Close to Areas Affected by Closures
E
lectronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com
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Panel A: By Industry, in percent Switching loans Transfer loans Nonswitching loans
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 5.45 4.61 1.95
Mining and quarrying 0.32 0.27 0.71
Manufacturing 24.31 38.62 34.41
Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 0.17 0.00 0.11
Water supply; sewerage; waste managment and remediation activities 0.34 0.44 0.31
Construction 7.97 5.05 7.81
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 34.53 34.28 41.55
Transporting and storage 4.79 5.49 2.78
Accommodation and food service activities 4.28 1.68 1.56
Information and communication 1.48 0.44 0.82
Financial and insurance activities 0.3 0.09 0.11
Real estate activities 2.34 0.8 0.74
Professional, scientific and technical activities 5.47 1.95 2.87
Administrative and support service activities 3.03 3.72 2.29
Education 0.75 0.44 0.29
Human health and social work activities 2.79 1.42 1.07
Arts, entertainment and recreation 0.79 0.27 0.29
Other 0.89 0.44 0.34
Panel B: By Region, in percent Switching loans Transfer loans Nonswitching loans
Aveiro 9.53 17.27 11.42
Beja 1.32 0.27 0.89
Braga 12.08 15.68 17.05
Bragança 0.95 1.15 0.41
Castelo Branco 1.27 1.33 1.24
Coimbra 3.65 3.9 3.44
Faro 3.2 3.45 1.92
Funchal 1.52 0.89 1.04
Guarda 0.98 0.97 0.67
Leiria 5.94 11.87 6.46
Lisboa 18.46 11.87 16.32
Ponta Delgada 0.81 0.18 0.84
Portalegre 0.94 1.06 0.61
Porto 20.98 16.56 21.99
Santarém 5.6 3.28 6.06
Setúbal 4.81 4.43 3.42
Viana do Castelo 1.79 1.51 1.66
Vila Real 1.25 1.06 0.7
Viseu 3.09 2.66 2.33
Évora 1.84 0.62 1.54
Appendix Statistics
Industry and Region of Firms that Transfer
In this appendix  we show the distribution of non-switching loans, switching loans and loan transfers by industry and region.
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June 2012 Openings Closures June 2012 Openings Closures June 2012 Variation June 2012 Switchers Transferer
s
Abrantes 10 0 2 25 0 8 1.21 -0.39 241 42 4
Águeda 10 0 0 28 0 5 1.05 -0.19 624 113 13
Aguiar da Beira 5 0 1 6 0 1 2.26 -0.38 63 15 1
Albergaria-a-Velha 8 0 1 11 1 2 0.78 -0.07 285 64 8
Albufeira 10 0 0 34 0 5 1.40 -0.21 497 68 1
Alcácer do Sal 5 0 0 7 0 0 1.02 0.00 146 24 0
Alcanena 5 0 0 6 0 0 0.82 0.00 254 73 0
Alcobaça 10 0 0 33 0 3 1.07 -0.10 764 169 37
Alcochete 7 0 0 8 0 0 0.80 0.00 155 23 0
Alcoutim 3 0 0 4 0 0 3.27 0.00 17 1 0
Alenquer 10 0 2 20 0 3 0.83 -0.12 383 58 10
Alfandega da Fé 3 0 0 4 0 0 1.57 0.00 31 8 0
Alijo 4 0 0 7 0 1 1.17 -0.17 82 23 2
Aljezur 4 0 0 4 0 0 1.31 0.00 44 6 0
Aljustrel 4 0 0 6 0 0 1.22 0.00 61 12 0
Almada 11 0 1 77 0 13 0.81 -0.14 943 146 4
Almeida 5 0 0 6 0 0 1.77 0.00 42 4 0
Almeirim 10 0 1 11 0 1 0.88 -0.08 246 54 2
Almodôvar 3 0 0 3 0 0 0.81 0.00 45 7 0
Alpiarça 3 0 0 4 0 0 1.00 0.00 74 14 0
Alvaiázere 5 0 0 7 0 0 2.06 0.00 76 16 0
Amadora 13 0 1 66 0 11 0.68 -0.11 980 146 0
Amarante 10 0 0 15 0 0 0.48 0.00 494 97 3
Amares 5 0 0 7 0 0 0.68 0.00 164 26 2
Anadia 9 0 0 15 0 1 0.96 -0.06 285 50 4
Angra do Heroísmo 9 0 0 21 1 2 1.07 -0.05 210 36 0
Ansião 7 0 0 11 0 1 1.66 -0.15 164 22 0
Arcos de Valdevez 9 0 0 11 0 2 0.99 -0.18 127 20 5
Arganil 5 0 0 8 0 1 1.34 -0.17 108 13 3
Arouca 8 0 3 9 1 3 0.74 -0.16 271 51 5
Arraiolos 4 0 0 5 0 0 1.31 0.00 93 18 0
Arruda dos Vinhos 7 0 2 7 0 2 0.95 -0.27 166 36 8
Aveiro 13 0 1 66 0 13 1.46 -0.29 801 122 12
Avis 3 0 0 4 0 0 1.85 0.00 42 10 0
Azambuja 6 0 0 11 0 1 0.90 -0.08 163 32 6
Baião 6 0 1 7 0 1 0.64 -0.09 108 15 2
Barcelos 11 0 1 48 0 8 0.70 -0.12 1265 217 11
Barreiro 10 1 2 29 1 4 0.67 -0.07 332 65 6
Batalha 8 0 1 9 0 2 1.04 -0.23 300 40 10
Beja 11 1 3 23 1 4 1.19 -0.16 420 93 7
Belmonte 6 0 1 7 0 1 1.98 -0.28 72 16 3
Benavente 10 0 1 20 0 2 1.24 -0.12 336 73 5
Bombarral 8 0 1 9 0 1 1.28 -0.14 125 23 8
Borba 6 0 2 6 0 2 1.57 -0.52 73 15 0
Boticas 3 0 0 3 0 0 1.06 0.00 23 3 0
Braga 14 0 1 104 0 16 0.98 -0.15 2013 354 28
Bragança 11 0 2 22 0 5 1.15 -0.26 277 58 6
Cabeceiras de Basto 6 0 2 8 0 2 0.93 -0.23 113 20 3
Cadaval 6 0 1 7 0 1 0.96 -0.14 133 17 3
Caldas da Rainha 10 0 0 27 0 4 0.97 -0.14 466 97 2
Calheta 7 0 0 11 0 0 1.32 0.00 58 6 0
Câmara de Lobos 7 0 0 10 0 0 0.53 0.00 124 18 1
Caminha 9 1 2 13 1 3 1.46 -0.23 138 28 5
Campo Maior 3 0 0 3 0 0 0.68 0.00 67 18 0
Cantanhede 10 0 1 25 1 3 1.30 -0.10 351 73 8
Carrazeda de Ansiães 3 0 0 3 0 0 0.97 0.00 46 5 0
Carregal do Sal 5 0 0 6 0 0 1.22 0.00 66 14 0
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(concelho) in Portugal. We exclude municipalities with fewer than 2 banks. Bank and branch openings and closures and variation in branch density refer to the
period between June 2012 and May 2015.
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We compute the number of banks, number of branches, branch density (number of branches per 1,000 adults) and number of firms for each municipality
(concelho) in Portugal. We exclude municipalities with fewer than 2 banks. Bank and branch openings and closures and variation in branch density refer to the
period between June 2012 and May 2015.
Number of Banks Number of Branches Branch density Number of Firms
Cartaxo 10 0 1 12 0 1 0.90 -0.07 209 39 8
Cascais 12 0 0 111 1 18 0.96 -0.15 1692 274 2
Castanheira de Pêra 3 0 0 3 0 0 1.92 0.00 23 3 0
Castelo Branco 11 0 0 33 0 7 1.09 -0.23 420 66 5
Castelo de Paiva 4 0 0 4 0 0 0.43 0.00 103 20 0
Castro Daire 7 0 0 9 0 0 1.20 0.00 111 18 0
Castro Marim 5 0 2 5 0 2 1.44 -0.58 47 7 0
Castro Verde 5 0 0 5 0 0 1.32 0.00 48 16 0
Celorico da Beira 5 0 0 5 0 0 1.33 0.00 45 9 0
Celorico de Basto 5 0 0 6 0 0 0.56 0.00 114 24 0
Chamusca 4 0 0 6 0 0 1.13 0.00 107 25 0
Chaves 11 0 0 19 0 1 0.87 -0.05 301 58 1
Cinfães 4 0 0 6 0 0 0.56 0.00 94 15 1
Coimbra 12 0 0 105 0 19 1.28 -0.23 1405 210 8
Condeixa-a-Nova 6 0 0 6 0 0 0.62 0.00 114 19 1
Constância 3 0 0 4 0 0 1.81 0.00 38 11 1
Coruche 6 0 0 7 0 0 0.70 0.00 241 44 0
Covilhã 10 0 1 27 1 4 0.96 -0.11 408 68 8
Crato 3 0 3 4 0 4 2.24 -2.24 24 3 1
Cuba 3 0 0 3 0 0 1.22 0.00 20 2 0
Elvas 10 0 2 16 0 3 1.36 -0.25 207 32 1
Entroncamento 8 0 1 11 0 3 0.98 -0.27 115 23 3
Espinho 11 0 0 21 0 1 1.18 -0.06 217 30 0
Esposende 10 0 1 18 0 2 0.93 -0.10 294 50 3
Estarreja 8 0 0 15 0 3 1.03 -0.21 163 35 0
Estremoz 7 0 0 10 0 0 1.40 0.00 172 30 0
Évora 13 0 1 41 0 5 1.31 -0.16 625 112 4
Fafe 10 0 0 14 0 1 0.50 -0.04 515 89 5
Faro 12 0 1 56 0 8 1.51 -0.22 601 99 3
Felgueiras 10 0 0 27 0 0 0.83 0.00 846 225 1
Ferreira do Alentejo 3 0 0 3 0 0 0.70 0.00 96 28 0
Ferreira do Zêzere 4 0 0 4 0 0 0.96 0.00 90 18 0
Figueira da Foz 10 0 0 30 0 3 0.88 -0.09 481 76 1
Figueira de Castelo Rodrigo 5 0 0 5 0 0 1.69 0.00 48 6 0
Figueiró Dos Vinhos 3 0 0 3 0 0 0.96 0.00 63 9 0
Freixo de Espada a Cinta 3 0 0 3 0 0 1.64 0.00 13 2 0
Fronteira 3 0 3 4 0 4 2.37 -2.37 35 8 3
Funchal 13 0 2 90 1 23 1.40 -0.34 1046 141 1
Fundão 9 0 1 15 0 3 1.01 -0.20 271 35 3
Gavião 3 0 0 3 0 0 1.68 0.00 23 5 0
Golegã 4 0 0 5 0 0 1.78 0.00 61 8 0
Gondomar 11 0 1 52 0 8 0.53 -0.08 941 173 2
Gouveia 5 0 0 7 0 0 1.05 0.00 89 11 0
Grândola 6 0 0 9 0 1 1.14 -0.13 129 22 0
Guarda 11 0 0 26 0 5 1.11 -0.21 324 61 0
Guimarães 11 1 0 75 1 9 0.82 -0.09 2042 437 67
Horta 10 0 1 13 0 2 1.52 -0.23 93 7 0
Idanha-a-Nova 3 0 0 5 0 0 1.24 0.00 81 16 1
Ílhavo 9 0 1 17 0 3 0.77 -0.14 305 47 18
Lagoa 8 0 0 25 0 2 1.95 -0.16 315 49 1
Lagos 11 0 1 20 0 4 1.17 -0.23 307 32 6
Lajes do Pico 4 0 0 6 0 1 2.38 -0.40 14 3 0
Lamego 9 0 1 14 0 3 0.96 -0.21 201 32 3
Leiria 14 1 1 93 1 14 1.31 -0.18 1725 319 13
Lisboa 24 2 3 639 7 110 2.18 -0.35 7652 1161 3
Loulé 11 0 0 55 0 5 1.40 -0.13 873 125 9
Loures 13 0 1 129 0 23 1.12 -0.20 1627 238 14
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We compute the number of banks, number of branches, branch density (number of branches per 1,000 adults) and number of firms for each municipality
(concelho) in Portugal. We exclude municipalities with fewer than 2 banks. Bank and branch openings and closures and variation in branch density refer to the
period between June 2012 and May 2015.
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Lourinha 9 0 0 19 0 1 1.24 -0.07 268 58 13
Lousa 7 1 1 8 1 2 0.77 -0.10 171 30 9
Lousada 8 0 1 9 0 1 0.34 -0.04 494 118 36
Mação 4 0 1 5 0 1 1.56 -0.31 70 12 1
Macedo de Cavaleiros 8 0 0 10 0 1 1.26 -0.13 123 20 0
Machico 7 0 0 10 0 2 0.80 -0.16 101 18 0
Madalena 7 0 0 7 0 0 2.12 0.00 66 4 0
Mafra 10 0 0 39 0 7 0.90 -0.16 724 113 24
Maia 12 0 0 64 0 10 0.79 -0.12 1459 289 14
Mangualde 8 0 0 8 0 0 0.77 0.00 187 38 6
Marco de Canaveses 9 0 1 17 0 5 0.57 -0.17 471 94 21
Marinha Grande 10 0 1 20 0 4 0.91 -0.18 525 119 31
Marvão 3 0 0 3 0 0 1.74 0.00 16 2 0
Matosinhos 12 0 0 93 0 18 0.90 -0.17 1529 272 6
Mealhada 8 0 1 13 0 2 1.16 -0.18 187 36 6
Meda 4 0 0 4 0 0 1.64 0.00 30 5 0
Melgaço 7 0 1 7 0 1 1.65 -0.24 42 4 0
Mértola 3 0 0 3 0 0 0.87 0.00 43 9 0
Mesão Frio 3 0 0 3 0 0 1.25 0.00 26 5 0
Mira 6 0 0 7 0 0 1.07 0.00 69 12 0
Miranda do Corvo 4 0 0 4 0 0 0.57 0.00 98 10 0
Miranda do Douro 6 0 0 8 0 0 2.18 0.00 50 6 0
Mirandela 9 0 1 13 0 2 1.05 -0.16 176 32 5
Mogadouro 4 0 0 4 0 0 0.85 0.00 54 10 0
Moimenta da Beira 5 0 0 6 0 0 1.17 0.00 90 15 0
Moita 8 0 0 18 0 0 0.49 0.00 272 50 6
Monção 8 0 1 8 0 1 0.80 -0.10 155 23 4
Monchique 3 0 0 5 0 0 1.65 0.00 28 4 0
Mondim de Basto 4 0 0 4 0 0 1.05 0.00 46 6 0
Monforte 3 0 0 3 0 0 1.92 0.00 39 6 0
Montalegre 8 0 1 10 0 1 1.97 -0.20 57 4 1
Montemor-o-Novo 8 0 1 11 0 1 1.25 -0.11 197 37 3
Montemor-o-Velho 5 0 0 8 0 0 0.56 0.00 201 30 0
Montijo 10 0 0 26 0 7 0.89 -0.24 433 79 1
Mora 3 0 0 4 0 0 1.65 0.00 37 9 0
Mortágua 4 0 0 4 0 0 0.80 0.00 101 19 0
Moura 6 0 0 8 0 0 1.06 0.00 111 18 0
Mourão 3 0 0 3 0 0 2.40 0.00 11 2 0
Murtosa 4 0 0 5 0 1 0.93 -0.19 58 13 0
Nazaré 8 0 0 9 0 0 1.07 0.00 93 22 1
Nelas 6 0 0 8 0 0 1.09 0.00 109 23 1
Nisa 4 0 0 4 0 0 1.18 0.00 44 12 0
Nordeste 4 0 0 4 0 0 1.57 0.00 15 3 0
Óbidos 5 0 0 8 0 0 1.26 0.00 144 33 0
Odemira 5 0 0 15 0 0 1.10 0.00 195 33 0
Odivelas 3 0 0 4 0 0 0.05 0.00 870 130 1
Oeiras 14 0 0 98 2 16 1.02 -0.15 1614 277 5
Oleiros 3 0 0 4 0 0 1.51 0.00 39 2 0
Olhão 9 0 1 19 0 2 0.76 -0.08 275 42 5
Oliveira de Azeméis 10 0 0 27 0 3 0.69 -0.08 843 156 9
Oliveira de Frades 8 0 1 8 1 1 1.49 0.00 154 36 4
Oliveira do Bairro 7 0 1 15 1 4 1.22 -0.24 276 44 10
Oliveira do Hospital 6 1 0 8 1 0 0.74 0.09 210 32 1
Ourém 11 0 0 37 0 5 1.56 -0.21 550 89 9
Ourique 3 0 0 3 0 0 1.13 0.00 30 6 0
Ovar 10 0 0 24 0 2 0.76 -0.06 510 103 5
Paços de Ferreira 10 0 0 26 1 8 0.81 -0.22 597 131 13
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2749155
June 2012 Openings Closures June 2012 Openings Closures June 2012 Variation June 2012 Switchers Transferer
s
Number of Banks, Branches, Branch Density, and Number of Firms per Municipality
Appendix Data
We compute the number of banks, number of branches, branch density (number of branches per 1,000 adults) and number of firms for each municipality
(concelho) in Portugal. We exclude municipalities with fewer than 2 banks. Bank and branch openings and closures and variation in branch density refer to the
period between June 2012 and May 2015.
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Palmela 8 0 0 20 0 0 0.57 0.00 527 106 11
Pampilhosa da Serra 4 0 0 4 0 0 2.03 0.00 20 8 0
Paredes 11 0 1 47 0 10 0.94 -0.20 842 161 18
Paredes de Coura 5 0 0 5 0 0 1.06 0.00 36 4 0
Pedrógão Grande 3 0 0 3 0 0 1.65 0.00 48 8 0
Penacova 6 0 0 7 0 0 0.85 0.00 128 23 0
Penafiel 10 0 0 30 0 4 0.74 -0.10 606 93 1
Penalva do Castelo 3 0 0 3 0 0 0.77 0.00 29 4 0
Penamacor 3 0 0 4 0 0 1.71 0.00 24 5 0
Penedono 3 0 0 3 0 0 2.06 0.00 11 1 0
Peniche 9 1 1 15 1 3 1.00 -0.13 228 39 4
Peso da Régua 9 0 1 11 0 2 1.17 -0.21 133 25 4
Pinhel 4 0 1 6 0 1 1.30 -0.22 58 11 3
Pombal 10 0 0 40 0 1 1.41 -0.04 597 97 10
Ponta Delgada 9 1 0 58 2 12 1.50 -0.26 483 69 2
Ponta do Sol 4 0 0 5 0 0 1.12 0.00 37 4 0
Ponte da Barca 6 0 0 6 0 0 0.97 0.00 75 14 0
Ponte de Lima 10 0 1 18 0 2 0.78 -0.09 336 51 7
Ponte de Sôr 7 0 0 9 0 0 1.01 0.00 121 17 0
Portalegre 10 0 2 13 0 4 0.96 -0.30 183 33 4
Portel 3 0 0 4 0 0 1.24 0.00 40 6 0
Portimão 11 0 0 33 0 5 1.06 -0.16 495 71 2
Porto 20 0 1 280 5 47 2.17 -0.33 3024 535 4
Porto de Mos 9 0 0 16 0 0 1.14 0.00 317 59 3
Porto Santo 4 0 0 4 0 0 1.22 0.00 26 1 0
Povoa de Lanhoso 9 0 1 11 0 2 0.82 -0.15 217 32 3
Povoa de Varzim 11 0 1 31 0 2 0.80 -0.05 591 92 6
Povoação 4 0 0 5 0 0 1.48 0.00 26 1 0
Proença-a-Nova 6 0 0 6 0 0 1.51 0.00 86 8 0
Redondo 5 0 0 5 0 0 1.39 0.00 69 9 0
Reguengos de Monsaraz 5 0 0 7 0 0 1.26 0.00 115 18 0
Resende 5 0 0 5 0 0 0.86 0.00 46 14 0
Ribeira Brava 6 0 0 7 0 1 0.98 -0.14 60 12 0
Ribeira de Pena 4 0 0 5 0 1 1.52 -0.30 32 2 0
Ribeira Grande 7 0 0 13 1 0 0.78 0.06 137 12 0
Rio Maior 10 0 1 12 0 1 1.05 -0.09 222 56 6
Sabugal 6 0 0 6 0 0 1.11 0.00 62 9 0
Salvaterra de Magos 6 0 1 9 0 1 0.76 -0.08 240 61 5
Santa Comba Dão 4 0 1 4 0 1 0.67 -0.17 115 27 3
Santa Cruz 6 0 0 14 0 2 0.54 -0.08 168 30 4
Santa Cruz da Graciosa 4 0 0 5 0 1 2.15 -0.43 10 0 0
Santa Maria da Feira 11 0 1 60 0 9 0.74 -0.11 1509 313 20
Santana 3 0 0 3 0 0 0.74 0.00 19 2 0
Santarém 11 0 1 37 0 5 1.12 -0.15 678 137 0
Santiago do Cacem 8 0 1 18 0 2 1.07 -0.12 266 48 3
Santo Tirso 10 0 0 40 0 3 0.97 -0.07 727 138 26
São Brás de Alportel 8 0 0 8 0 0 1.39 0.00 82 14 0
São João da Madeira 9 0 0 31 0 4 2.48 -0.32 399 89 10
São João da Pesqueira 4 0 1 5 0 1 1.23 -0.25 83 6 0
São Pedro do Sul 5 0 0 6 0 0 0.71 0.00 126 11 0
São Roque do Pico 4 0 0 4 0 0 2.18 0.00 26 2 0
São Vicente 3 0 0 4 0 0 1.35 0.00 22 2 0
Sardoal 3 0 0 4 0 1 2.01 -0.50 29 5 0
Sátão 5 0 0 6 0 0 0.95 0.00 70 8 0
Seia 9 0 1 12 0 1 0.92 -0.08 205 43 9
Seixal 11 0 0 52 0 8 0.57 -0.09 919 155 4
Sernancelhe 3 0 0 4 0 0 1.42 0.00 46 12 0
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We compute the number of banks, number of branches, branch density (number of branches per 1,000 adults) and number of firms for each municipality
(concelho) in Portugal. We exclude municipalities with fewer than 2 banks. Bank and branch openings and closures and variation in branch density refer to the
period between June 2012 and May 2015.
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Serpa 5 0 0 8 0 0 1.00 0.00 116 21 0
Sertã 8 0 0 10 0 0 1.27 0.00 140 30 0
Sesimbra 9 0 2 19 0 4 0.68 -0.14 323 49 6
Setúbal 12 0 0 54 0 9 0.80 -0.13 823 130 6
Sever do Vouga 6 0 0 6 0 0 0.92 0.00 159 27 0
Silves 9 0 0 23 0 1 1.14 -0.05 274 34 1
Sines 8 1 1 8 1 1 0.99 0.00 173 36 7
Sintra 12 0 0 138 1 23 0.64 -0.10 2684 480 45
Sobral de Monte Agraço 7 0 1 8 0 2 1.42 -0.35 102 17 3
Soure 5 0 0 7 0 0 0.70 0.00 100 12 0
Sousel 4 0 0 6 0 0 2.51 0.00 74 15 0
Sta. Marta de Penaguião 4 0 1 6 0 1 1.53 -0.25 47 11 1
Tábua 5 0 0 6 0 0 0.98 0.00 96 24 0
Tabuaço 3 0 0 4 0 0 1.20 0.00 47 6 0
Tarouca 5 0 0 5 0 0 1.16 0.00 53 10 0
Tavira 9 1 0 18 1 5 1.28 -0.29 235 47 0
Terras de Bouro 3 0 0 4 0 0 1.08 0.00 29 6 0
Tomar 10 0 1 19 0 4 0.91 -0.19 275 56 2
Tondela 10 0 1 14 0 3 0.96 -0.20 213 30 3
Torre de Moncorvo 4 0 0 4 0 0 0.97 0.00 63 8 0
Torres Novas 10 0 0 18 0 1 0.93 -0.05 333 55 0
Torres Vedras 11 0 0 50 0 6 1.15 -0.14 765 153 17
Trancoso 7 0 0 8 0 0 1.67 0.00 80 6 0
Trofa 4 0 4 4 0 4 0.18 -0.18 481 95 12
Vagos 8 0 0 14 0 0 1.14 0.00 193 32 0
Vale de Cambra 9 0 0 12 0 1 0.95 -0.08 241 45 12
Valença 11 0 1 12 0 1 1.58 -0.13 146 28 1
Valongo 10 0 0 40 0 7 0.72 -0.13 659 134 3
Valpaços 9 0 1 13 0 1 1.58 -0.12 98 15 2
Velas 5 0 0 5 0 0 1.69 0.00 48 2 0
Vendas Novas 9 0 2 9 0 2 1.47 -0.33 120 29 8
Viana do Alentejo 5 0 1 6 0 1 2.09 -0.35 51 11 1
Viana do Castelo 11 0 0 43 0 5 0.87 -0.10 680 121 8
Vidigueira 4 0 0 4 0 0 1.35 0.00 36 10 0
Vieira do Minho 5 0 0 5 0 0 0.75 0.00 54 11 0
Vila de Rei 4 0 0 4 0 0 2.76 0.00 31 7 0
Vila do Bispo 4 0 1 5 0 1 1.75 -0.35 54 7 2
Vila do Conde 10 0 0 33 0 5 0.72 -0.11 702 116 17
Vila do Porto 3 0 0 4 0 1 1.29 -0.32 37 2 0
Vila Flor 3 0 0 4 0 0 1.17 0.00 52 10 0
Vila Franca de Campo 7 0 1 7 0 1 0.97 -0.14 38 2 1
Vila Franca de Xira 10 0 0 59 0 6 0.73 -0.07 906 152 7
Vila Nova de Cerveira 5 0 0 6 0 0 1.22 0.00 72 10 0
Vila Nova de Famalicão 11 0 1 55 0 9 0.71 -0.12 1412 294 48
Vila Nova de Foz Côa 3 0 0 5 0 0 1.40 0.00 50 5 0
Vila Nova de Gaia 12 0 0 116 1 23 0.66 -0.12 2134 376 29
Vila Nova de Paiva 3 0 0 3 0 0 1.20 0.00 39 10 0
Vila Nova de Poiares 3 0 0 3 0 0 0.76 0.00 94 19 0
Vila Pouca de Aguiar 7 0 0 8 0 0 1.17 0.00 99 15 0
Vila Praia da Vitoria 9 0 0 15 0 3 1.07 -0.21 66 9 0
Vila Real 11 0 0 31 0 3 1.06 -0.10 386 49 0
Vila Real de Santo António 9 0 1 18 0 4 1.73 -0.39 159 29 4
Vila Verde 9 0 2 20 0 5 0.78 -0.20 399 68 8
Vila Viçosa 4 0 0 6 0 0 1.34 0.00 116 21 1
Vimioso 4 0 0 5 0 0 2.39 0.00 22 2 0
Vinhais 4 1 0 5 1 0 1.18 0.24 40 5 0
Viseu 13 0 1 65 0 15 1.19 -0.27 969 153 9
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Vouzela 3 0 0 4 0 0 0.76 0.00 81 16 1
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